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NORMS OF SOLIDARITY AND REGIONALISM: 
THEORIZING STATE BEHAVIOR AMONG 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES 
Luwam Dirar* 
Despite many recognized ambivalences, “norms of solidarity” 
portrays a dominant picture of foreign policy practices of Southern 
African states. The central argument of this article is that norms of 
solidarity, state behavior among Southern African states, and regional 
integration arrangements are not only about material interests, but also 
social construction and turn to ideational concerns in the continent’s 
decolonization and emancipatory movements. Indeed material interests 
as Rational Choice scholars have successfully shown are relevant in 
understanding how states behave towards each other in the region. 
Nevertheless, interests and preferences are also constructed through 
ideational concerns. Therefore, among Southern African states, foreign 
policy is recognition of the relationship between ideational and material 
concerns in forming foreign policies, alternatively called norms of 
solidarity. Through time, the practice and consistency of norms of 
solidarity has been contested, constituted, and re-constituted. In the 
Southern African context, reconstitution of norms of solidarity happens 
through economic pressures. This article thus interrogates the 
relationship between economic pressures and norms of solidarity. It 
looks at European Union-Southern African states relations to analyze if 
states under dire economic situations follow the value and consistency of 
norms of solidarity. When economic pressures overshadow social 
emancipatory movements, the ideational concerns of norms of solidarity 
become historical triumphs without application. Nevertheless, self-
identity of African statehood, or African-ness, persists beyond the 
confines of membership in regional integration schemes, legality and 
material ontology. This article does not claim to be the sole explanation 
of how and why states behave the way they do in Southern African 
integration schemes. Rather, it is an attempt to theorize norms of 
solidarity in relation to Southern African integration arrangements.  
 
 
 
 
 
668 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.3 
 
 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 668 
I.   RATIONALITY AND NORMS INTERTWINED? ................................. 672 
A.  Are Norms of Solidarity Specific to Southern  
 African States? ..................................................................... 677 
B.  Norm Recognition: Observance & Breach—Approval & 
Disapproval? ........................................................................ 681 
1.  Norm Recognition or Normative Shift among Southern 
African States ............................................................. 684 
II.   NORMS OF SOLIDARITY ................................................................. 686 
A.   Norms of Solidarity: Ambivalences of African-ness .......... 689 
B.  Is African-ness Penance for Apartheid? ............................... 694 
1.  Nelson Mandela’s Presidency: African-ness & South 
Africa’s relations with Nigeria ................................... 696 
2.  Mbeki and Zuma: African-ness & South Africa’s 
Relations with Zimbabwe ........................................... 700 
C.   Norms of Solidarity and Regional Integration  
 Arrangements ....................................................................... 703 
III.   NORMS OF SOLIDARITY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS ................... 704 
A.  Reality of EU-Southern African States Trade Relations ...... 710 
1.  EU-Africa Relations: Partnership or Customary 
Platitude? .................................................................... 717 
2.  Negotiations for EPAs and Global Trade  
 Liberalization.............................................................. 719 
B.  Norms of Solidarity and Trade Relations with the EU ........ 721 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 723 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
State behavior among members of regional integration schemes, for 
instance Southern African states, is not only about material interests, but 
also social construction and ideational concerns in the continent’s 
decolonization project. The central argument of this article is that 
relations among Southern African states are defined by norms of 
solidarity, which combine ideational and material concerns. Before 
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explaining theoretical approaches to understanding state behavior, it is 
relevant to explain “norms” and “norms of solidarity.” A norm is “a 
standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”1 
Norms of solidarity form and regulate solidarity as logic of 
appropriateness among African states in general and Southern African 
states in particular. Alternatively, norms of solidarity are patterns of 
thought that establish state behavior by formulating concepts of the 
function and value of African-ness.2 Through a process of socialization, 
  
 * Research Associate Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard 
University; and J.S.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School. I am deeply grateful for the 
encouragement and comments of my chair Chantal Thomas who rightfully noted my 
previous failure to explain the relationship between state behavior and regional 
integration among Southern African states. Special thanks should also go to Muna Ndulo, 
Robert Hockett, James Gathii, Steven Bloomfield, William Alford, Kibrom 
Teweldebirhan, Jenny Wilder, Stanley Fisher, Funmi Akinosi and Rabiat Akande. This 
article was written while I was in residence at the Weatherhead Center for International 
Affairs, Harvard University. Special thanks also goes to Cornell Law School for the 
moral and material support I have received to pursue my project. This Article is a chapter 
in my J.S.D. dissertation at Cornell Law School, tentatively titled “The European Union 
as an Exogenous Factor in Integration Schemes of southern African States.” 
1  1.  There exist definitional problems that can be raised with the use of the word 
“norm” instead of “institutions” as sociologists more generally use. For sociologists, the 
distinction between “norm” and “institution” is that “norm” indicates “single standards of 
behavior” while “institution” is a collection of interrelated norms. Martha Finnemore & 
Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 
887, 891 (1998). This definitional problem is not, however, a problem for International 
Relations scholars in general and “constructivists” in particular. In addition, norms can be 
categorized into “regulatory norms,” “constitutive norms,” and “prescriptive norms.” Id. 
While the first “regulatory norms” and “constitutive norms” generally have a straight-
forward meaning, “prescriptive norms” are not always accepted as a third category, but 
rather as part of either “regulatory” or “constitutive” norms. Id. 
 2. See Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of Sen., Address at the 1963 African 
Summit (May 23, 1963), in CELEBRATING SUCCESS: AFRICA’S VOICE OVER 50 YEARS 
1963–2013, at 85 (2013) [hereinafter CELEBRATING SUCCESS]. Senghor defines African-
ness as the basis of African Unity beyond shared experiences. In his words: 
Most of us feel that what brings us close to one another and must 
unite us is our position as under developed countries, formerly 
colonized. Nor is that wrong. But we are not the only countries in 
that position. If that could be said objectively to be whole truth, 
then African Unity ought one day to dissolve with the 
disappearance of under-development. 
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continental and regional norms of solidarity are internalized to establish 
the tenets of state behavior among African states.3 Norms of solidarity 
create identity of African-ness as a destiny of African states beyond the 
confines of geographic proximity.4 Thus, norms of solidarity based on 
  
I am convinced that what binds us lies deeper; and my conviction 
is based on scientifically demonstrable facts. What binds us is 
beyond history: it is rooted in pre-history. It arises from 
geography, ethnology, and hence from culture. It existed before 
Christianity and Islam; it is older than all colonization. It is that 
community of culture which I call African-ness. I would define it 
as “the sum total of African civilized values: Whether it appears 
in its Arab-Berber aspect or its African Negro aspect, African-
ness always shows the same characteristics of passion in feelings, 
and vigor in expression. I recognize an African carpet among 
those of all other continents. It is no mere chance that some 
mosaic in Bardo Museum resembles some Mali ‘pagne.’” 
It seems to me Senghor’s passion to tie feelings of African-ness as scientific or 
biologically unity among Africans is a bit limited and actually flawed. For one, it 
dismisses and ignores Kenyan Indians from having feelings of African-ness and thereby 
declares them as non-African. Second, there is no scientific claim that shows that 
Africans—whether black, Arab or Berber—are genetically related, apart from Senghor’s 
“conviction.” Therefore, in this article my understanding of African-ness is that African-
ness is a reactionary identity to colonial and racial oppression. 
 3. Norm socialization in this context is not used to signify the understanding of 
Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink. For Risse and Sikkink, norm socialization is a 
“process by which international norms are internalized and implemented domestically.” 
Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights 
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 5 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999). On 
the contrary, here it is used to signify how regional or continental norms of solidarity are 
internalized and domesticated by the African state. 
 4. For Nelson Mandela, South Africa was linked with other African states by 
“destiny.” Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 86, 
89–90 (1993). He further emphasized that this “destiny” is “more than a mere 
geographical concept.” Id. at 90. Nelson Mandela’s chose the terminology “destiny,” 
instead of “future.” Although both can be synonymously used, “destiny” has more of a 
hidden force that controls the future, and this hidden force that exists among African 
states is what I refer to as “norms of solidarity” in this article. 
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unity and comradeship define “African-ness” as good and lack thereof as 
something bad.5  
Norms of solidarity are incorporated in regional and sub-regional 
treaties. For instance, the African Union (AU) aspires to achieve 
“solidarity between the African countries.”6 Similarly, article 4(b) of the 
Southern African Development Community Treaty (SADC Treaty) 
prescribes that all members of SADC shall act in accordance with 
principles of solidarity.7 Although the AU charter and SADC Treaty 
encompass solidarity as objectives of both organizations, when it comes 
to how and when solidarity arrangements are to be invoked and/or 
implemented both organizations are silent.8 Which brings into question 
when, how, why, and by whom norms of solidarity are to be observed? 
Are states, even under dire circumstances, able and willing to stand in 
solidarity with each other? What consequences do economic pressures 
  
 5. The analysis and understanding of norms of solidarity in this article is a 
macro-state level analysis. I understand that solidarity arrangements can and do exist at 
individual and group levels. It can exist across sectors and minority groups. On the other 
hand, it can also exist among majority groups and political elites. For instance, Thomas 
Kwasi Tieku analyzes solidarity arrangement among African political elites. See, e.g., 
Thomas Kwasi Tieku, Solidarity Intervention: Emerging Trends in AU’s Interventions in 
African Crisis, Address at the Chatham House Workshop: Africa International: Agency 
and Interdependency in a Changing World (Oct. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/bisa-africa/confpapers/solidarity-intervention.pdf. 
 6. Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 3, para. a, opened for signature 
July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 33 (entered into force May 26, 2001) (stating “[t]he 
objectives of the Union shall be to: achieve greater unity and solidarity between the 
African countries and the peoples of Africa.”). Art. 3, para. a also identifies three strands 
of solidarity arrangements: (1) solidarity arrangements between and among African 
states, (2) solidarity arrangements between and among African people, and (3) solidarity 
arrangements between and among African states and people. Id. Understanding these 
possibilities, however, the focus of this article is on solidarity arrangements among states. 
Hence, the reference to African Union solidarity arrangements are, for the purposes of 
this article, limited to solidarity among members of the African Union. 
 7. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community art. 4, Aug. 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 116, 124 (enumerating “SADC and its Member States shall act in 
accordance with the following principles: a) sovereign equality of all Member States; b) 
solidarity, peace and security; c) human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; d) equity, 
balance and mutual benefit; e) peaceful settlement of disputes.”). 
 8. See generally Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 6, art. 3; 
Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, supra note 7, art. 4. 
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have for norms of solidarity? Under what circumstances do African 
states manage to observe norms of solidarity and on what grounds? This 
article attempts to theorize norms of solidarity in order to define and 
analyze foreign policy among Southern African states and in their 
relations with the European Union (EU).  
Part I offers a brief introduction to rationalist and constructivist 
approaches to state behavior. I build on the works of constructivist 
scholars such as Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, Amitav Acharya, 
and Jeffrey T. Checkel. With an emphasis on the relationship between 
ideational and material concerns, I attempt to explain the limitations and 
need for synergy of compartmentalized rationalist and constructivist 
understandings of state behavior. Part II analyzes the concept of norms of 
solidarity in intra-regional relations of Southern African states. 
Preconceptions of understandings, misunderstandings of constructive 
engagement and quiet diplomacy as the sole foreign policy tool of norms 
of solidarity challenge the character and function of African-ness. I 
further argue that African-ness does not prohibit sanctions nor does it 
advocate for constructive engagement. African-ness, as an identity of 
Southern African states and norms of solidarity as a collage of several 
norms, condemns “interference in internal affairs of member states.” 
After mapping the practice of norms of solidarity among Southern 
African states, Part III discusses the relationship between economic 
pressures and norms of solidarity by looking at EU-southern African 
relations. The central argument of Part III is that Southern African states 
lack a common foreign policy towards the EU. In addition, fear of 
market access to Europe, without any ideational concerns, shadows 
foreign policy-making among Southern African states. 
I.   RATIONALITY AND NORMS INTERTWINED? 
To understand state behavior among Southern African states, 
rationalist and constructivist understandings of state behavior are 
discussed here.9 First, in explaining state behavior, rationalists as a 
  
 9. One might wonder why there is a limited focus on rationalist and 
constructivist approaches to state behavior. The focus on rationalism and constructivism 
in this article is not in any way intended to ignore the existence and value of other 
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liberal and social scientific enterprise, albeit limited and narrowly 
understood, focus on the power of reason.10 Conventionally, acting 
rationally means choosing the most feasible alternative, in other words, 
self-interest maximizing choice.11 For instance, Switzerland’s 
relationship with apartheid South Africa, although masked with the 
rhetoric of neutrality, was rather a preference of economic interests over 
ideational matters.12 Switzerland’s ideational concerns were limited to 
the domestic arena while self-interest maximization defined its 
relationship with Apartheid South Africa.13 In addition, global policies 
such as UN sanctions on Apartheid South Africa did not affect the 
  
theories of state behavior, for instance, realism. However, there is a general conception 
that realists, just like rationalists, assume states to be rational actors. See generally Joe A. 
Oppenheimer, Rational Choice Theory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THEORY 1150, 
1150–59 (Mark Bervir ed., 2010) (discussing the conceptual understanding of rational 
choice). Cf. John J. Mearsheimer, Reckless States and Realism, 23 INT’L REL. 241, 241–
56 (2009) (explaining how realists and rationalists share common assumptions of the 
state, Mearsheimer focuses on Kenneth Waltz’s assumptions of the state. For 
Mearsheimer, Waltz’s rejection of states as rational, self-interest, maximizing actors 
makes Waltz’s conception of state behavior questionable.). 
 10. Jon Elster noted:  
[R]ational choice theory appeals to three distinct elements in the 
choice situation. The first element is the feasible set, i.e., the set 
of all courses of action which (are rationally believed to) satisfy 
various logical, physical, and economic constraints. The second 
is (a set of rational beliefs about) the causal structure of the 
situation, which determines what course of action will lead to 
what outcomes. The third is a subjective ranking of the feasible 
alternatives, usually derived from a ranking of the outcomes to 
which they (are expected to) lead. To act rationally, then, simply 
means to choose the highest-ranked element in the feasible set.  
Miles Kahler, Rationality in International Relations, 52 INT’L ORG. 919, 923 (1998) 
(quoting Jon Elster). 
 11. See Oppenheimer, supra note 9. 
 12. See Kahler, supra note 10. 
 13. See generally Peter Hug, Aligning with the Apartheid Government against 
Communism: Military, Armaments Industry, and Nuclear Relations between Switzerland 
and South Africa and the UN Apartheid Debate of 1948-1994, 42+ NRP 1 (2004) 
(showing how Switzerland secretly supported the apartheid regime until the abolition of 
apartheid in 1994).  
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materialistic consideration of Switzerland.14 Materialist ontology of 
rationalist understanding is one of the reasons Switzerland’s foreign 
policy towards Apartheid South Africa was both feasible and logical 
behavior. Therefore, Switzerland maintained a self-interested 
maximizing policy—even if it meant collaborating with Apartheid South 
Africa. 
Second, rational understanding, by adopting binary behavioral 
models—rational and irrational—lacks the capacity to explain the 
ideational realm, especially when rationale is associated with a self-
interested maximizing goal. The Reagan administration, for instance, 
based on purely materialistic observations, supported the Apartheid 
Regime in South Africa.15 President Reagan summarized the basis of 
American support for Apartheid South Africa as “a country that stood by 
us in every war we have ever fought, a country that strategically is 
essential to the free world in its production of minerals.”16 Contrary to 
President Reagan’s economic interests, the U.S. Congress acted on 
ideational anti-apartheid policies and imposed sanctions on apartheid 
South Africa.17 The role of domestic norms of equality, and its 
correlation to the civil rights movement in the U.S., not only changed 
U.S. policies towards apartheid South Africa, but is also a clear example 
of circumstances beyond the duality of rational and irrational 
  
 14. See generally Ibrahim J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each 
Human Being: The United Nations, NGOs, and Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1464 
(1995) (discussing the UN’s role in the anti-apartheid struggle from 1946-1990). 
 15. See Interview by Amy Goodman with Father Michael Lapsley, Dir., Inst. for 
Healing Memories, in New York, N.Y. (June 11, 2004) (quoting interview by Walter 
Cronkite with Ronald Reagan, President of the United States (Mar. 3, 1981)). 
 16. Id. See also Scott Bronstein, Do Metal Sales Subsidize Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 23, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/23/business/do-metal-sales-subsidize-
apartheid.html (discussing how South Africa, next to the Soviet Union, is the second 
biggest producer of platinum and how politically and economically members of the 
Platinum Guild believed it is less costly for the U.S. to import platinum from South 
Africa even it meant supporting Apartheid in the latter). 
 17. Phillip I. Levy, Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do?, 89 AM. 
ECON. REV. 415, 417–18 (1999) (discussing the imposition of sanctions by the U.S. on 
apartheid South Africa and its impact).  
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narratives.18 This is not to stipulate that rational understanding does not 
consider ideational factors. Rather, when ideational concerns are 
entertained, it is fashioned in strictly materialistic scrutiny. The U.S. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed under the Commerce Clause, prohibited 
segregation and the discrimination of African Americans.19 Instead of 
arguing for equality on principles of dignity, the focus on the Commerce 
Clause by Congress is a clear example of how ideational concerns, 
analyzed under materialistic lenses, could consequentially dehumanize 
concerns of equality.20 Justice Robert H. Jackson eloquently summarized 
the dehumanizing effect of equality under the Commerce Clause as, “the 
migrations of a human being . . . do not fit easily into my notions as to 
what is commerce . . . [t]o hold that the measure of his rights is the 
commerce clause is likely to result eventually either in distorting the 
commercial law or in denaturing human rights.”21 In brief, ideational 
concerns could fall beyond the duality of rational and irrational 
narratives. The aim here is not to dethrone reason as a model for 
  
 18. See generally Audie Klotz, Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial 
Equality and U.S. Sanctions against South Africa, 49 INT’L ORG. 451 (1995) (analyzing 
the role of norms in changing U.S. policies with regard to apartheid South Africa). See 
also William Minter & Sylvia Hill, Anti-Apartheid Solidarity in United States – South 
Africa Relations: From the Margins to the Mainstream, in THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 745 (SADET ed., 2008) (discussing the similarities and affinity between 
the civil rights movement in the United States and the anti-apartheid movement in South 
Africa). 
 19. See Commerce Clause, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause (last visited Apr. 5, 2014) (discussing 
how the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed under the Commerce Clause). See also John 
Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the 
Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998) (discussing how at times 
ideational factors are examined in materialistic perspective).    
 20. See generally James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the 
Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing how incorporating basic human rights under the 
commerce clause can limit the understanding of rights). In addition, Justice Jackson also 
summarized how incorporating concerns of equality under the Commerce Clause can be 
limiting. Chester James Antieau, Equal Protection Outside the Clause, 40 CALIF. L. 
REV. 362, 370 (1952) (quoting Edwards v. People of the State of California, 314 U.S. 
160, 182 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 21. Id.  
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understanding state behavior among Southern African states, but rather 
to show that state behavior is not always based on reason.  
Constructivists, in contrast, consider emotional and moral factors to 
achieve political goals.22 Constructivism is human consciousness at its 
international level.23 Identities and interests of actors are therefore 
socially constructed and rest with other ideational factors.24 Similar to the 
flaws of pure rationalism, constructivism also displays a degree of 
naiveté in ignoring material interests as defining factors in changing or 
forming logics of appropriateness.25 In the African context, anti-apartheid 
foreign policy was driven by ideational concerns of the inhuman 
treatment of South African people.26 For constructivists, therefore, 
ideational concerns of African anti-apartheid movements led to 
continental anti-apartheid policies. Such constructivist framing of foreign 
policy-making among African states, however, could create arguments 
for moral superiority of African states. In addition, constructivist 
engagement fails to capture calculated-materialist foreign policy-making 
among Southern African states. Malawi, for instance, established and 
maintained formal relations with apartheid South Africa based on 
rationalized materialistic calculations and contrary to the continental 
policy of isolation.27  
  
 22. Ruggie, supra note 19, at 856 (discussing how constructivism rests on an 
irreducibly inter-subjective dimension of human action). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (discussing how identities and interests are social constructs). 
 25. See generally Milja Kurki & Adriana Sinclair, Hidden in Plain Sight: 
Constructivist Treatment of Social Context and its Limitations, 47 INT’L POL. 1, 2–3 
(2010) (discussing theoretical and empirical limitations of constructivist theory). 
 26. See Zdenek Červenka, THE UNFINISHED QUEST FOR UNITY 23, 41, 110–22 
(1977) (discussing the position and reaction of members of the African Union towards 
Apartheid South Africa and Malawi’s relationship with the latter and how, after learning 
that Malawi established and maintained relations with Apartheid South Africa, some 
members of African Union called for its expulsion from the union). See also Organization 
of African Unity, Resolution on South Africa, C.M. Res. 1019 (XLIII), 
CM/RES/1019(XLIII) (Mar. 1986) (African Union member states condemning Apartheid 
in South Africa). 
 27. See generally Robert Davies & Dan O’Meara, An Analysis of South African 
Regional Policy Since 1978, 11 J. S. AFR. STUD. 183, 187–88 (1985) (discussing the 
relationship between Malawi and Apartheid South Africa in the 1970s). 
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Understanding limitations of rationalist and constructivist approaches 
to state behavior, several rationalist and constructivist scholars concur 
that norms and rationality are intertwined.28 The difficulty of measuring 
ideational phenomenon led to the correlation between “utility 
maximization” and “material terms,” which consequently led to material 
ontology in proponents of rationality.29 For proponents of constructivism, 
on the other hand, the propensity to counter norms and rationality fails to 
capture “strategic social construction” where normative behavioral 
changes are driven by rationality.30 Hence, to draw a binary division 
between rationality and norms is to ignore that “rational choice theory 
can easily accommodate nonmaterial or nonselfish [sic] interests.”31 In 
conclusion, in this article, the discussions on norms of solidarity are 
cognizant of the relationship between material interests and the power of 
ideas in defining and formulating state behavior.  
A.  Are Norms of Solidarity Specific to Southern African States? 
Whether it is to claim superiority, exceptionality, or uniqueness, it is 
quiet common to hear claims of regional or national specificity of norms. 
At times a result of ignorance, not knowing whether the norm exists in 
other parts of the world, advocates of regional or national norm 
specificity repeatedly claim the uniqueness of their region or nation. 
Such claims lead one to inquire whether there is a relationship between 
norms and geographic specificity. Are there norms that are particular, for 
example, to Africa, Asia, or Europe? If so, what makes a norm or group 
  
 28. See generally Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Norms and Domestic Politics: 
Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide, 3 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 473 (1997) (Checkel, 
in this article, bridges the theoretical and methodical gap on the discourse of norms as 
constitutive and constraining of state behavior). See generally Finnemore & Sikkink, 
supra note 1; Kahler, supra note 10; and Ruggie, supra note 19 (also noting that norms 
and rationality are intertwined). 
 29. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 1, at 889 (discussing how norms and 
rationality intersect). 
 30. See id. 
 31. Jon Estler, Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition, 94 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 685, 692 (2000) (reviewing ROBERT H. BATES ET. AL., ANALYTICAL 
NARRATIVES (1998)). 
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of norms African, Asian or European? And how does one identify 
regional specificity?  
In the human rights field, advocates of Asian-values defense, for 
instance, Lee Kuan Yew, argue that Asian norms emphasize order and 
discipline over freedom and liberty.32 For Yew and his supporters, norms 
that advocate for freedom and liberty are western ideals that do not 
conform to Asian values.33 Yew’s reasoning is methodologically flawed 
and a monolithic interpretation of Confucian thought; the reasoning 
advances oppressive behavior under the guise of resisting European 
Hegemony.34 Above all, it summarized “us” to mean ordered and 
  
 32. Lee Kuan Yew was the former Prime Minister of Singapore. The Asian 
values debate by challenging Human Rights discourse argues that Human Rights was 
western and not in conformity with Asian culture.  See generally Fareed Zakaria, Culture 
is a Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 109, 111, 114 (1994) 
(discussing his views Asian values and its relationship to freedom and liberty). See also 
Ian Taylor, Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights, 107 AFR. AFF. 63, 
66 (2007). Notice how Ian Taylor’s discussion of Human Rights took a dual dichotomy 
of how socio-economic rights are discussed as Chinese, and Civil and Political Rights as 
Western conceptions of Human Rights. Taylor noted, “China’s current discourse on 
human rights is grounded in a communitarian focus on social solidarity and obligations 
towards others, coupled with an aspiration to advance societal concord.” Id. at 65. 
 33. See generally Zackaria, supra note 32. 
 34. For Sen, the methodological claim with the Asian values defense research is 
that it tends to draw the conclusion of what the past was from what the present is today. 
Therefore, it emphasizes the idea of Europe as the moral compass of the world and 
European enlightenment at the center of norm entrepreneurship and diffusion of what is 
good in this world. Sen eloquently argued:  
Authoritarian lines of reasoning often receive indirect backing 
from modes of thought in the West itself. There is clearly a 
tendency in the United States and Europe to assume, if only 
implicitly, the primacy of political freedom and democracy as a 
fundamental and ancient feature of Western culture—one not to 
be easily found in Asia. A contrast is drawn between 
authoritarianism allegedly implicit in, say, Confucianism and the 
respect for individual liberty and autonomy allegedly deeply 
rooted in Western liberal culture. Western promoters of personal 
and political liberty in the non-Western world often see this as 
bringing Western values to Asia and Africa. . . . Values spread by 
the European Enlightenment and other relatively recent 
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disciplined Asians and “them” to mean disordered and undisciplined 
others.  
The idea of geographic norm specificity was also used to justify 
superiority of one group over another. For instance, by creating discourse 
of “us” (civilized Europeans) and “them” (savage Africans), historical 
records show how norm geographic specificity was used to justify 
colonial ambitions.35 Similarly, and with a more contemporary setting, 
Ian Manners’s work on Europe as a normative power reinforces the idea 
of Europe’s normative superiority and its role as a global moral 
compass.36 Manners’s contention of Europe’s normative power situates 
Europe as the global compass of what is good.37 Here again, irrespective 
of its Eurocentric logic, Manners’s conception of European normative 
power creates discourse of norm superiority without analyzing the 
existence, or lack thereof, of said norm in non-European societies. 
In the African context, Tore Nyhamar argues rather boldly that there 
are four norms in Africa.38 These are: (1) African solutions for African 
  
developments cannot be considered part of the long-term Western 
heritage, experienced in the West over millennia. 
Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values, Address at the Carnegie Council on 
Ethics and International Affairs: Sixteenth Morgenthau Mem’l Lecture on Ethics & 
Foreign Policy 7, 15 (1997). 
 35. See Michael Adas, Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian 
Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology, 15 J. WORLD HIST. 31 (2004) (discussing 
European norm superiority and how it disguised colonial ambitions as civilizing 
missions). 
 36. See Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, 40 J. 
COMMON MKT. STUD. 235 (2002) (discussing the idea of Europe as a normative power). 
 37. Ian Manner’s argument for Normative Power EU has been subject to critique 
by several scholars as Eurocentric among others. See Thomas Diez, Constructing the Self 
and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe, 33 MILLENNIUM J. 
INT’L STUD. 613 (2005) (critiquing the idea of Europe as a normative power, Diez in this 
piece calls for more reflexivity). Similarly, Storey and Durac by using the example of 
Europe-Morocco relationship show that the idea of Europe as a normative power is 
flawed. See Andy Storey & Vincent Durac, ‘Normative or Realist’ versus ‘Normative and 
Realist,’ (Apr. 23, 2009) (paper for presentation at EUSA Eleventh Biennial International 
Conference, Los Angeles), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/33141/1/storey._andy.pdf (last 
updated Mar. 16, 2013).  
 38. Tore Nyhamar, How Do Norms Work? A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 
of African International Relations, 5 INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 27, 29 (2000). Nyhamar cites 
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problems; (2) African states have three primary goals, which are 
hierarchically ranked as independence, development and unity; (3) 
conquest of African states is outlawed; and (4) independence of all 
African states.39 Nyhamar’s question of which norms exist in Africa 
implies a list—which, in this case is incomplete—and limits the 
understanding of norms as standards of appropriateness in governing 
state behavior among and between African states. Such codification from 
Nyhamar limits his work on norms and international relations in Africa. 
His decision to make a list, which excluded norms of equality, could lead 
one to argue that norms of equality are un-African and, by that measure, 
are of European origin.40 Nyhamar’s list, irrespective of its limitations, 
and also as a result of its limitations, creates discourses of “us” vs. 
“them.”  
For Yew, Manners, or Nyhamar, such specification of which norms 
exist in particular geographic specificity, without examining its existence 
or lack thereof in other parts of the world, brings a discourse of “us” and 
“them” and thereby forms self-identity. It is far from the aim of this 
article to claim that norms of solidarity are solely African. On the 
contrary, the discussions on norms of solidarity in this article do not deny 
the existence or lack of norms of solidarity in other parts of the world. It 
is beyond the confines of this article to do such exploration. Therefore, 
this article, without claiming African exceptionalism, attempts to analyze 
the impact of norms in general, and norms of solidarity in particular, in 
framing foreign relations of Southern African states.  
  
and refers to I. William Zartman. Id. However, it seems to me that Nyhamar misread 
Zartman’s analysis of Africa’s system and wrongfully attributes the codification of four 
African norms to Zartman. Zartman did not limit or codify African norms. See I. William 
Zartman, Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations, 21 INT’L ORG. 
545, 558–61 (1967). In his work, without limiting or excluding the existence of other 
norms, Zartman described the workings of African subordinate system. Id. 
 39. Nyhamar, supra note 38. 
 40. See Klotz, supra note 18 (discussing norms of equality in South Africa).  
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B.  Norm Recognition: Observance & Breach—Approval & 
Disapproval? 
There are conceptual and empirical problems in norm recognition. 
Norms of solidarity are not always legislated in regional integration 
agreements. If and when they are promulgated, for instance among 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Treaty (COMESA) 
member states, solidarity is legislated as sets of governing principles.41 
Yet, in positivist legal tradition, principles are not always justiciable and 
take the role of mere guidance of behavior.42 How does one thus 
recognize the existence of a particular norm or group of norms if its 
existence is not always explicitly adopted in a treaty? Furthermore, when 
norms are promulgated as principles without legal force, how does one 
recognize its observance or breach if it is not justiciable before courts? In 
this article, state behavior is used as a tool to recognize and understand 
how and why states behave in regard to certain normative 
  
 41. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Treaty art. 6, Sept. 1, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 1067, 1076 [hereinafter COMESA],  
The Member States, in pursuit of the aims and objectives stated 
in Article 3 of this Treaty, and in conformity with the Treaty for 
the Establishment of the African Economic Community signed at 
Abuja, Nigeria on 3rd June, 1991, agree to adhere to the 
following principles . . . solidarity and collective self-reliance 
among the Member States. 
 42. See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 
823 (1972) (discussing positivist assumptions that laws differ from principles and how 
such thinking draws limits of law and legality); see also Eric Christiansen, Adjudicating 
Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional 
Court, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321 (2007) (discussing justiciable and non-
justiciable laws. In addition, see how Christiansen discusses the African National 
Congress’s Charter. Christiansen notes how incorporating the principles in the final 
constitution needed some form of formal process, in order for the principles to have legal 
enforceability.). 
In this article, despite notable difference between principles and norms, preference is 
given to the use of ‘norms;’ since both set standards of appropriate behavior despite their 
legislation status. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INT’L ORG. 185, 186 (1982) For Krasner, “norms” 
and “principles” are distinct. Id. “Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude,” 
while “‘norms’ are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.” Id. 
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commitments.43 This article, in order to identify normative commitments 
of Southern African states, looks specifically at norm observance or 
breach and the reactions specific actions generate in Southern African 
communities.44 
Generally speaking, norm observance could generate praise or may 
lack public recognition, while norm breach could generate public 
condemnation. The former, norm observance, taken as the expected 
behavior of an actor, might be difficult to recognize if there was no 
public recognition. On the contrary, since norm breach generally 
generates disapproval it is easily recognizable. The next crucial question 
is whose approval or disapproval matters to render an act or failure to act 
as norm observance or breach? In today’s globalized world, a set of 
norms could be shared at the sub-regional, continental, and global level. 
Therefore, a particular behavior could receive varied reactions at the sub-
regional, continental, and global levels. Looking at norm observance and 
breach, or approval and disapproval of a particular behavior, could be the 
flip side of asking whose norms matter. Analysis on hierarchy of norms 
is, however, concerned with the relationship between global and 
domestic norms.45 On the contrary, the focus in this section is not on 
norm superiority. Rather, in this article, approval and disapproval of 
norms are used as exploratory tools to identify the existence, or lack of 
existence, of a particular norm or group of norms. 
  
 43. State behavior in this article includes past actions, present actions, official 
and unofficial statements among others. One could argue that norm recognition through 
state behavior recognizes norms of the past and not necessarily of the future. 
Understanding such critique, however, the focus on state behavior is not limited to 
actions of the past, but also of the present. See Annika Björkdahl, Norms in International 
Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections, 15 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L 
AFF. 9, 13 (2002) (discussing the empirical and conceptual challenges in norm 
recognition). 
 44. One might argue that using state practice—norm observance and norm 
breach—among Southern African states is in a way alleviating norms of solidarity to the 
status of customary international law. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 
38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
 45. See generally Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? 
Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT’L ORG. 239, 
242–43 (2004). 
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During the Arab Spring of Libya, one could notice varied and at times 
striking reactions among African states and global actors. Members of 
the African Union proposed a negotiated transition in Libya in contra to 
Western powers, which preferred armed intervention.46 The central 
norms that members of African unity aspired to preserve include 
prohibition of foreign interference in domestic affairs of member states.47 
Global actors rejected the proposed solutions of the African Union and 
resulted in the rejection of a negotiated solution for Libya.48 Although 
several questions could be raised on the relationship of the African 
Union with other international actors, the question that is relevant to this 
article is whose approval and disapproval matters in rendering a behavior 
either norm observing or norm breaking? In short, the disapproval of the 
African proposal for Libyan issues by global actors brings into question 
whose disapproval renders an act norm breach. Clearly, there existed a 
clash of normative proposals and priorities between African states and 
global actors. In analyzing norms of solidarity, its observance or breach, 
the exploratory task of this article is limited to the community of African 
states and their historical and contemporary solidarity arrangements. The 
next subsection, therefore, inquires within the community of Southern 
African states, whose approval or disapproval matters.  
  
 46. Alex Dewaal, The African Union and the Libya Conflict of 2011, WORLD 
PEACE FOUND., (Dec. 19, 2012), http:// http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/ 
19/the-african-union-and-the-libya-conflict-of-2011/; Paul D. Williams, From Non-
Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s 
Security Culture, 106 AFR. AFF. 253, 261 (2007) (generally discussing norms of non-
interference in internal affairs of member states among the African Union).  
 47. See Organization of African Unity, Declaration On The Framework For An 
OAU Response To Unconstitutional Changes Of Government, AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) 
(Jul. 2000) (explaining that African Union member states condemn unconstitutional 
change of government); see also Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 6, art. 
4, para. g (prohibiting interference in internal affairs of member states); see also African 
Union, Communique of the 275th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, 
PSC/MIN/COMM.2 (CCLXXV), at 2 (Apr. 26, 2011). 
 48. Dewaal, supra note 46. 
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1.  Norm Recognition or Normative Shift among Southern 
African States  
Southern African states, by establishing the SADC Tribunal, set 
norms of justice as appropriate behavior among members of the 
community. The member states agreed that the breach of norms of justice 
needed to be rectified and penalized; hence, they created the Tribunal.49 
However, the Tribunal’s de facto suspension and subsequent decision to 
limit its jurisdiction have certainly impacted access to justice of Southern 
African citizenry.50 But do the actions of Southern African states and 
their decision to dissolve the Tribunal amount to a norm breach? If state 
behavior—which in this case is Southern African states—establishes the 
existence and/or breach of norms, does the dissolution of the Tribunal 
amount to a shift in normative stance rather than a norm breach?  
Dissolution of the Tribunal was praised and criticized. Southern 
African states—the community that set the Tribunal as a tool for the 
enforcement of justice—approved the de facto dissolution of the 
Tribunal.51 Correspondingly, Julius Malema, party leader of the South 
African Economic Freedom Fighters, implicitly praised the Zimbabwean 
government and the dissolution of the Tribunal as a positive move 
towards redistributive justice.52 On the contrary, Ariranga G. Pillay, 
  
 49. See also Southern African Development Community Protocol on Tribunal 
and the Rules of Procedure Thereof (2000), available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof
2000.pdf.  
 50. See generally Michelo Hansungule, The Suspension of the SADC Tribunal, 
35 STRATEGIC R. S. AFR. 135 (2013), available at http://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/ 
Legacy/sitefiles/file/46/1322/michelohansungulepp135145.pdf. 
 51. See Franny Rabkin, SADC tribunal judges say court’s dissolution ‘illegal’, 
NEW ZIMBABWE (Jun. 28, 2011), http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-5453-
SADC+tribunal+judges+fume+over+dissolution/news.aspx.  
 52. Although not directly praising the dissolution of the SADC Tribunal, Julius 
Malema, by praising actions of the Zimbabwean government in relation to minority 
landowners, indirectly dealt with the SADC Tribunal’s decision. See, e.g., Malema 
Praises Mugabe, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.yahoo.com/malema-praises-
mugabe-062950369.html. Implicitly, it seems to me that Malema supports dissolution of 
the Tribunal because if the Tribunal’s decision against Zimbabwe was enforced, 
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former president of the Tribunal, noted dissolution of the Tribunal as a 
missed opportunity “for the advancement of principles of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law in the SADC region.”53 Similarly, the 
SADC Lawyers’ Association condemned dissolution of the Tribunal as a 
setback in regional integration efforts and a “disregard for the rule of 
law.”54  
Taking it a step further, the Pan African Lawyers Union and the 
Southern Africa Litigation Center questioned the legality of the 
dissolution of the Tribunal in front of the African Human Rights Court 
(AHRC).55 Similarly, Luke Tembani and Benjamin Freeth petitioned the 
African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) 
to declare the suspension of the Tribunal as a violation of the SADC 
Treaty.56 In both cases, the claimant’s petitions and prayers were either 
dismissed or denied.57 Indeed, neither the decision of the AHRC, nor the 
Commission, mean that both entities either approve or disapprove of the 
  
Zimbabwe’s land policy would be nullified, which for Malema would mean Zimbabwe’s 
land policy will fail to address issues of redistributive justice. 
 53. Ariranga G. Pillay, Reflecting on the SADC Tribunal: A Missed 
Opportunity?, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. FOR S. AFR. 7 (Mar. 2013), http://osf.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/Reflecting-on-the-SADC-Tribunal-a-missed-opportunity.pdf.  
 54. Kondwa Sakala-Chibiya, Official Communiqué of the Fourteenth Annual 
General Meeting and Conference of the SADC Lawyers’ Association, SADC LAWYERS’ 
ASS’N (Aug. 15, 2013), http://lawyersofafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Official-
Communique-of-the-14th-SADCLA-AGM-
Conference.pdf?utm_source=Original+Mailing+List&utm_campaign=0c38c932a8-
14th+SADCLA+AGM+Communique&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_7ac5a3e611-
0c38c932a8-27188645 (“The suspension of the SADC Tribunal presents lacunae for the 
consolidation of regional integration efforts and facilitates the impugned disregard for the 
Rule of Law in the region, which should be minimized by SADC legal professionals 
through active and creative engagement of supranational courts and fora.”). 
 55. Suspension of SADC Tribunal, Advisory Op. 002/2012, Afr. Ct. H. & 
Peoples R. (Mar. 15, 2013) (discussing the decision of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on the request for an advisory opinion of the legality of the dissolution of 
the SADC Tribunal). 
 56. Freeth and Tembani also petitioned the court to rule that dissolution of the 
Tribunal was also a violation of the African Charter and general principles of 
international law. See generally Luke Tembani & Benjamin Freeth v. Angola & Thirteen 
Others, Afr. Comm’n H. & Peoples R., Communication No. 409/12, 54th Ordinary 
Session (2013). 
 57. See id.  
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dissolution of the SADC Tribunal. Rather, both the AHRC and the 
Commission gave legal analysis of the issues at hand from a purely 
legalistic approach.58 This brings into question the relationship between 
courts and norm observance/breach. Alternatively, the question is: 
because the dissolution of the Tribunal was not found to be a violation 
of, for instance, the African Charter, does it warrant one to conclude 
there was no norm breach? What is the relationship between law and 
norms?  
As indicated at the outset, a norm is defined as “a standard of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”59 Likewise, law 
sets standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity. 
Norms, both legal norms and other norms, cohabitate in the same space 
and govern the same community of actors—in this case, Southern 
African states.60 The broader question of this article aspires to understand 
the influence of norms—including legal norms—in governing state 
behavior. In this context, it does not matter whether or not the norm is 
promulgated as law. It is not the legislation of the norm that matters, but 
its acceptance by Southern African states as a basis for interaction. The 
focus on norm observance/breach in this article is not only 
observance/breach of the SADC Treaty and its protocols, but also norms 
which were not promulgated by Southern African actors.  
II.   NORMS OF SOLIDARITY 
“Norms of solidarity” is a general label for a variety of related 
normative approaches to state behavior among Southern African states. 
Norms of solidarity comprises a variety of beliefs that manifest 
themselves as behavioral norms which create regulatory or constitutive 
standards of appropriateness. Although the SADC treaty and other formal 
  
 58. Id. The AHRC concluded that it does not have jurisdiction to analyze the case 
as on the ground that a similar issue was being entertained before the Commission. Id. On 
the other hand, the Commission ruled on the merits of the case and concluded first and 
foremost that its lack of jurisdiction to interpret and apply SADC Treaty. Id. 
 59. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 1. 
 60. See generally Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms Distinctive?, 32 NYU J. 
INT’L. L. & POL. 699 (1999).  
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treaty obligations among Southern African states create standards of 
appropriateness, norms of solidarity are agnostic to legality and to 
membership of an integration scheme. Therefore, norms of solidarity 
treat the SADC treaty as either endogenous or exogenous depending on 
the problem under consideration. In short, norms of solidarity are 
reflected in mutual solidarity arrangements that expand beyond the 
confines of law, legality, and regionalism. 
Norms of solidarity among Southern African states are better 
understood as a part whose characteristics are determined by a larger 
continental project of African-ness.61 Continental feelings of African-
ness define the internal structure and dynamism of norms of solidarity 
among Southern African states. This is not to claim that continental 
feelings of African-ness originated in one part of Africa and not the 
other. Rather, a shared experience of colonialism and racial domination 
is what led to the social construction of African-ness among all African 
states.62 Hence, to limit the era of Southern African norms of solidarity to 
the formalization of sub-regional anti-apartheid resistance—through 
SADC—is to ignore the continental context of norms of solidarity.63  
  
 61. Unlike in colonial era conceptualization of Pan-Africanism, norms of 
solidarity in its post-colonial perspective is not mere replication; it is narrow and state 
level analysis. In its first phase (Garvey’s and Du Bois’s struggle for Pan-African unity) 
norms of solidarity transforms the social relations of African-ness without as yet altering 
the global order and state behavior at the international level. In the second phase (post-
independence era of African states), formerly independent African states as the framers 
of African order behave and influence global order. The discussion of norms of solidarity 
in this article is, however, limited to the second phase of post-independence Africa. 
 62. Tieku, supra note 5. See also Ali Mazrui, Pan-Africanism: From Poetry to 
Power, 23 J. OPINION 35, 35 (1995) (discussing solidarity among Africans to be the result 
of racial and colonial oppressions). 
 63. For norms of solidarity among Southern African states, if one was to limit the 
norm emergence era to the time when SADC was formalized—which was in 1980s—it 
looks like feelings of African-ness emerged in 1980s among Southern African states. 
Alternatively, it could also justify a possible argument—which argues that norms of 
solidarity actually started in other parts of the African continent and through the process 
of norm diffusion and localization—as theorized by Amitav Acharya—norms of 
solidarity were transplanted in Southern African states. See, e.g., Acharya, supra 45. In 
conclusion, by looking at Southern African norms of solidarity in its broader continental 
context it allows one to avoid debates and issues associated with identity of norm 
entrepreneurs in the construction and life cycle of norms of solidarity. Id. 
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Norms of solidarity, although a part in continental emancipatory 
project, is also a whole in its own right. Several norms (for instance 
racial equality, self-determination, equality of states, and equal access to 
a just and participatory global order, among others) interplay in building 
the underlying logic and path of norms of solidarity.64 Larger continental 
norms of solidarity determine norms of self-determination and “norms of 
equality.”65 Theoretically, “norms of racial equality” are in harmony with 
norms of solidarity, since the later was the platform that helped 
materialize norms of equality in the African continent.66 Notably, African 
norms of solidarity, which provide an account of the natural destiny of 
being African, have a potentially narrow geographical application, unlike 
norms of equality, which have universal application.67  
Norms of solidarity have potentially reached a degenerative state. The 
genesis of feeling of African-ness is related to the process of 
decolonization and racial equality in the continent.68 With the end of 
apartheid rule, the subsequent dissolution of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee, and the beginning of independence 
for all African states from western colonization, feelings of African-ness 
have declined. This degeneration has two significant sources. First, the 
organic norms of solidarity were diluted and eventually put in a 
degenerative state through inorganic policies of global financial and 
  
 64. Borrowing from Audie Klotz, “a norm of racial equality defines 
discrimination based upon racial categories (as evident in racist language, personal 
actions, and/or social policies) as bad and individual equality (lack of discrimination) as 
good.” Klotz, supra note 18, at 451. For a definition of norms of “equal access to justice” 
see Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1786 (2001) 
(“‘Equal justice’ is usually taken to mean ‘equal access to justice,’ which in turn is taken 
to mean access to law.”). 
 65. Mazrui, supra note 62, at 35 (discussing how solidarity was central to the 
struggles for self-determination and equality). 
 66. Id. 
 67. This could be interpreted as saying norms of solidarity are solely African. I 
have not explored the existence or lack of norms of solidarity in other parts of the world. 
Hence, I am not claiming African exceptionalism. In addition, the use of African-nature 
in this section, similar to the pan-Africanist movements, should be understood as the 
biological destiny of being black, a darker race, or non-Caucasian. 
 68. See generally Mazrui, supra note 62, at 35. 
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trade institutions, which favored marketization rather than African-ness.69 
Second, degeneration is the result of contradiction between regional and 
global norms. Laurie Nathan, for instance, reasons that conceptual 
degeneration of norms of solidarity led to the elevation of regional norms 
of solidarity over global norms of equality.70 These degenerations of 
norms of solidarity could be intra-regional or intra-state.71 The aim and 
approach of this article, however, is not to assess the state of 
degeneration or renaissance of African-ness, but rather to explain the role 
“African-ness” has had in shaping state behavior among Southern 
African states and Southern African regional integration arrangements. 
A.   Norms of Solidarity: Ambivalences of African-ness 
In order to understand norms of solidarity one needs to recognize its 
nuances. First, norms of solidarity portray post-colonial African states as 
virtuous states, which share a common rhythm of African-ness. This 
characterization paints a popular picture of African-ness as altruistic, 
where concerns of other African states are overwhelmingly present. For 
instance, Nyerere noted how “the whole of Africa speaks with one 
sincere voice.”72 In the spirit of African-ness, Nelson Mandela promised 
  
 69. African states are more passive and less active in their trade negotiations. 
Sheila Page noted that a third of African bureaucrats surveyed believe that domestic 
economic policies of their respective countries are formulated by global financial and 
trade institutions with little or no say from African governments. See Sheila Page, 
Developing Countries: in GATT/WTO Negotiations 42–43 (Overseas Dev. Inst., 2002). 
Hence, with little or no say from the African states it could be rationalized that 
degeneration of African-ness is the result of marketization. 
 70. See generally Laurie Nathan, Solidarity Triumphs Over Democracy – The 
Dissolution of the SADC Tribunal, 57 DEV. DIALOGUE, 123, 123–38 (2011) (arguing that 
dissolution of SADC Tribunal amounts to norms of solidarity triumph over democratic 
and legal principles of the SADC). 
 71. For an example of degeneration of norms of solidarity, see David 
Hirschmann, The Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa, 28 J. MODERN AFR. 
STUD. 1, 1–22 (1990) (discussing the black consciousness movement in South Africa and 
how that has changed and weakened through time). 
 72. Julius K. Nyerere, President of the Republic of Tanganyika, Address at the 
1963 African Summit (May 23, 1963), in CELEBRATING SUCCESS, supra note 2, at 100. 
For Nyerere, ‘one voice’ seems to represent solidarity against colonial and racial 
domination. Id. 
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that post-apartheid South Africa would restrain self-interested 
considerations for the benefit of its neighbors.73 In contra, relations 
among African states are fraught with tensions and application of norms 
of solidarity has been inconsistent. Even during the liberation struggle, 
support and solidarity for the continents decolonization project was 
subject to contradictory and clashing interests of the OAU member 
states.74 For instance, although the OAU’s Liberation Committee 
channeled moral and material support to half of the states that achieved 
independence since its establishment, its early retirement failed to put an 
end to the question of Western Sahara.75  
  
 73. Mandela, supra note 4, at 91 (noting post-apartheid South African foreign 
policy will “resist any pressure or temptation to pursue its own interests at the expense of 
the sub-continent.”). Indeed, under apartheid rule South Africa had conflicting relations 
with its regional neighbors. Khabele Matlosa argues that South Africa’s behavior with its 
neighbors was benign, noting South Africa’s decision to renegotiate the Southern African 
Customs Union to create a more just compensation system for states like Lesotho and 
Swaziland. Khabele Matlosa, Vulnerability and Viability of Small States in Southern 
Africa in a Post-Apartheid Era: Is South Africa Still “Big Brother?”, 11 PULA J. AFR. 
STUD. 117, 117–31 (1997). Moreover, Matlosa also infers that South Africa’s 
intervention to resolve domestic problems of Lesotho and Swaziland was based on South 
Africa’s self-serving interests. Id. In short, for Matlosa, South Africa’s relationship with 
its neighbors is composed of self-serving policies in the political arena and redistributive 
justice policies in its regional economic interactions with Lesotho and Swaziland. Id. To 
the contrary, Adam Habib argues that considerations for economic interests of other 
African states are romantic ideals of the African National Congress, which will have a 
detrimental impact on South African economy. Adam Habib, Address at the Center for 
Policy Studies and Open Source Foundation of South Africa, Hegemon or Pivot?: 
Debating South Africa’s Role in Africa 2–3 (Aug. 2003). Habib argues that South Africa 
should take a hegemonic role in the region. Id. 
 74. See generally Amare Tekle, A Tale of Three Cities: The OAU and the 
Dialectics of Decolonization in Africa, 35 AFR. TODAY 49, 49–60 (1988) (discussing the 
role of OAU and its member states in the decolonization movement of Africa). 
 75. The OAU Liberation Committee was formed in the first assembly of heads of 
states of Africa in May 1963. Id. at 49. Since its establishment and up to its dissolution in 
1994, it helped eleven out of twenty two states gain their independence. OAU, 
Dissolution of the OAU Liberation Committee, Res. 228, pmbl., AHG/RES/228 (June 
1994). In dissolving the Liberation Committee, the OAU reasoned, “the mandate given to 
the Liberation Committee in 1963 has been satisfactorily accomplished.” Id. at para. 2. 
The issues of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic and Morocco’s invasion of the 
Western Saharan territory had not been resolved, yet the Liberation Committee was 
dissolved. Tekle, supra note 74, at 49. 
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Similarly, when it comes to multilateral negotiations, African 
solidarity is challenged. For instance, as a result of lack of resources, 
several African states do not have representatives in multilateral 
negotiations,76 and it is common for states such as South Africa and 
Egypt to represent Africa in World Trade Organization (WTO) forums 
and negotiations.77 However, when South Africa represents Lesotho in 
multilateral negotiations, it makes one wonder whether South Africa is 
concerned with the latter’s welfare given that inflation in Lesotho is 
driven by prices in South Africa.78 Likewise, when Ethiopia’s late Prime 
Minister, Meles Zenawi, represented Africa in the Copenhagen 
negotiations, he was criticized for using the negotiating platform for 
Ethiopia’s diplomatic considerations to the determent of the continent he 
represented.79 Similarly, Abdelkader Amara, Morocco’s Minister of 
Industry, Trade and New Technologies, claimed Morocco will “defend 
the interests of the continent.”80 For Minister Amara, Morocco’s status as 
a non-member of the African Union is irrelevant to its motive to defend 
the interests of the continent.81 This is not to argue that states outside of 
  
 76. See generally Page, supra note 69. 
 77. Id. at 43 (discussing how representation by big states such as South Africa is 
provoking other African states to participate as well). 
 78. Members of the S. Afr. Customs Union, Trade Policy Review, 
WT/TPR/G/222/Rev.1, at 16 (Dec. 8, 2009) (“Inflation in Lesotho is driven by prices in 
South Africa, which remains the main source for almost 95% of imports for final 
consumption.”). 
 79. Jean-Christophe Hoste, Where Was United Africa in Climate Change 
Negotiations?, AFR. POL’Y BRIEF 4 (Egmont Royal Inst. for Int’l Relations Feb. 2010). 
The late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi led the African delegation in 
Copenhagen negotiations. Id. Several parties, including Sudan’s chief negotiator 
Lumumba Di-Aping, accused Mr. Zenawi of betraying the African continent. Id. Some 
even suggested that Mr. Zenawi decided to use the opportunity to advance Ethiopia’s 
self-interest. Id. 
 80. Abdelkadar Amara, WTO Negotiations: Morocco Spares No Effort to 
Represent African Voice, THE MAGHERB DAILY (July 9, 2013), 
http://www.lemag.ma/english/WTO-negotiations-Morocco-spares-no-effort-to-represent-
African-voice_a4639.html. 
 81. Morocco suspended its membership in the African Union as a result of the 
African Union’s decision to recognize and admit the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. 
Clifford D. May, Morocco Quits O.A.U. Over Polisario, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1984), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/13/world/morocco-quits-oau-over-polisario.html. 
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Africa lack positive intentions towards the continent, but rather, it 
illustrates that altruistic state behavior is possible.  
Second, solidarity arrangements could be motivated by self-interested 
considerations rather than ideational concerns. Explaining substantive 
solidarity arrangements, Milton Obote eloquently summarized that “[o]n 
no single issue has Africa ever been so solidly united as on the question 
of apartheid and colonialism.”82 But why were already independent 
African states united to fight racial and colonial domination? Could it be 
motivated by “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” politics? 
Understanding the normative and principled ideas that drove 
decolonization and anti-apartheid movements in the continent, it is 
theoretically possible for African states to stand in solidarity against 
colonial powers out of self-interested considerations. Kwame Nkrumah 
reasoned that in the post-colonial stage, an independent state does not 
and cannot exist except in the midst of other independent African 
states.83 Clearly, living with a friendly neighbor has significant impact on 
the allocation of resources and development planning.84 For these 
reasons, achieving independence in all African states reduces fear of re-
colonization and thereby allows newly independent states to achieve 
other aspirations. In addition, one could argue that some states received 
material benefits as result of their normative stance. For instance, despite 
their principled anti-apartheid attitude, one could argue that because 
Southern African states amassed tons of foreign aid, the Southern 
African integration arrangements were the result of a materialistic policy 
disguised as an ideational anti-apartheid stance.85 
  
 82. Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda, Address at the 1963 African 
Summit (May 23, 1963), in CELEBRATING SUCCESS, supra note 2, at 108. 
 83. Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, Closing Remarks at the 1963 African 
Summit (May 23, 1963), in CELEBRATING SUCCESS, supra note 2, at 126–27 (“As I have 
said over and over again, the independence of our separate States is meaningless, unless 
the whole of Africa becomes free and united.”). 
 84. See Global Peace Index 2015, VISION OF HUMANITY, 
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/global-peace-index/2015 (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2015). 
 85. Martin Adelmann, Fundraising or Common Foreign Policy? 30 Years of 
SADC Consultative Conference, in MONITORING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA YEARBOOK 4 (Anton Bösl et al. eds., 2008) (showing that the anti-apartheid 
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Third, aspects of norms of solidarity have long been subject to 
criticism by scholars who noted that norms of solidarity have legitimized 
authoritarian states.86 As a result of norms of solidarity, some African 
states enjoy membership in regional and sub-regional integration 
schemes, although the schemes may lack legitimacy within their 
domestic constituencies. For instance, without legitimacy from its actual 
citizenry, the Zimbabwean government enjoys regional support and 
membership in SADC.87  
Despite ambivalences, however, norms of solidarity play a central 
role in defining the foreign policy of African states in general, and 
Southern African states in particular. Specifically, in the anti-apartheid 
movement of Southern African states, the role, function, and value of 
norms of solidarity led to contemporary post-apartheid South Africa.88 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether norms of solidarity hold 
value in post-apartheid era. In the post-apartheid era, how do norms of 
solidarity work among Southern African states? How do South Africa’s 
historical wrongs affect its current status in the region? How are norms 
of solidarity practiced? What foreign policy tools do Southern African 
states use in their solidarity arrangements? The next sections attempt to 
  
movement of SADC states received over a billion US dollars between the years of 1980–
1987). 
 86. See generally Tieku, supra note 5. For a critique of how continental pan-
African integration alienated the African people and failed to establish Pan-African 
solidarity, see also Tim Murithi, African Approaches to Building Peace and Social 
Solidarity, 6 AFR. J. CONFLICT RESOL. 9, 29 (2006).  
 87. Elias Mambo, Irony of SADC’s Mugabe Endorsement, ZIM. INDEP. (Aug. 23, 
2013),http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2013/08/23/irony-of-sadcs-mugabe-
endorsement/ (discussing the relationship between legitimacy and regional integration 
membership with particular focus on Zimbabwe and SADC). Similarly, despite popular 
protests in Kenya—”don’t be vague, let’s go to [t]he Hague” - the AU’s decision on the 
relationship between Africa with the International Criminal Court (ICC) called for 
suspension of Uhuru Kenyatta’s trial at the ICC. Gabrielle Lynch & Miša Zgonec-Rožej, 
The ICC Intervention in Kenya, 1 AFR./INT’L LAW 4-5 (2013); see also AU. EXT. ASS. 
DECL. 1-4 (Oct. 2013) (especially note how the justifications provided by the AU do not 
mention or put into consideration the popular protests in Kenya that called for ICC trials). 
 88. See Julius Nyerere, Review of African Political Economy, in AFRICA TODAY 
AND TOMORROW 149–52 (Mar. 1998) available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006369 
?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.  
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answer some of these questions in order to proffer why, when, and by 
whom norms of solidarity are practiced.  
B.   Is African-ness Penance for Apartheid? 
The end of Apartheid is celebrated as a rebirth of African-ness in 
South Africa’s foreign policy. South Africa’s apartheid foreign policy 
was best summarized by John Barratt as “one of trying to ensure the 
security, status and legitimacy of the state within the international system 
against the background domestically of preserving a white-controlled 
state.”89 Additionally, apartheid South Africa resorted to “coercive 
hegemony” and power politics to influence behavioral shifts in majority 
black controlled Southern African region.90 Therefore, the pre-post-
apartheid era on foreign policy making of South Africa focused on 
making minor shifts in diplomatic relations of South Africa with the rest 
of Africa.91 Contrarily, in the post-apartheid period the need for re-
immersion of South Africa into a pool of African states brought not only 
transference in racial equality policies of South Africa, but also a shift in 
its relationship with states and people of the African continent.92 This 
transformation was led by Nelson Mandela and his outline of South 
Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy pillars, which included: (1) human 
rights, (2) democracy, (3) justice and respect for international law, (4) 
  
 89. Graham Evans, Myths and Realities in South Africa’s Future Foreign Policy, 
67 ROYAL INST. INT’L AFF. 709, 712 (1991) (quoting John Barratt). 
 90. For instance, see Roger Pfister, South Africa’s Recent Foreign Policy 
Towards Africa: Issues & Literature, 29 CTR. FOR INT’L STUD 1. (2000) (noting that 
during the apartheid era, South Africa, based on self-interested policies, focused on 
destabilizing other Southern African states; its foreign policy towards other African states 
was based on “coercive hegemony”). 
 91. See generally Evans, supra note 72 (discussing the role of the pre-post-
apartheid era on foreign policy making in South Africa). The then Director General of 
South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs affirmed South Africa’s commitment for 
“new diplomacy,” but not necessarily for “new foreign policy.” Id. Evans argues that this 
choice of phrase of “new diplomacy” over “new foreign policy” shows the limited shift 
one would see in post-apartheid South Africa. Id. 
 92. Pfister, supra note 90, at 12, 14.  
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peace and non-violence, (5) African-ness, and (6) regional and 
international economic cooperation.93  
In the economic policy sphere, the post-apartheid South African 
government focused on building consensus and asserting its African-ness 
through different foreign policy initiatives. For instance, South African 
politician Thabo Mbeki’s African renaissance movement espouses South 
Africa’s support of Pan-Africanism.94 Similarly, despite historical 
intentions of incorporating Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland into the 
Republic of South Africa, post-apartheid South Africa chose to 
renegotiate the terms of Southern African Customs Union (SACU) to 
create better profit sharing mechanism in favor of Botswana, Lesotho, 
and Swaziland.95 The hierarchy, relationship, and application of South 
Africa’s pillars of foreign policy, however, is dubious and problematic.96 
Hence, in the next two sub-sections, the question of whether African-
ness—alternatively, observance of norms of solidarity—is penance for 
South Africa’s historical wrongs, will be analyzed by looking at two 
specific foreign policy incidents.  
  
 93. Mandela, supra note 4, at 87. 
 94. See generally Gerrit Olivier, Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s Savior?, 79 ROYAL 
INST. INT’L AFF. 815, 815 (2003) (discussing how Mbeki articulates his ideas for Africa 
as a continuation of Pan-Africanist movement and calls himself neo-pan-Africanist; 
whereas “the original pan-Africanists sought the ‘political kingdom’ for Africa, Mbeki 
casts himself as a neo-pan-Africanist, seeking the ‘economic kingdom’ for the ailing 
continent”). 
 95. See Peter Robson, Economic Integration in Southern Africa, 5 J. MOD. AFR. 
STUD. 469, 469 (1967) (discussing how, historically, South Africa and Britain assumed 
that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland would ultimately be absorbed by the Republic of 
South Africa); see also Mandela, supra note 4, at 92–93. 
 96. See generally James Barber, The New South Africa’s Foreign Policy: 
Principle & Practice, 81 INT’L AFF. 1079 (2005). James Barber demonstrates the 
inconsistencies between South Africa’s foreign policy principles and practice: he 
describes that in its post-apartheid era, South Africa’s concerns were the pursuit of 
human rights and democracy, among other principles. Id. However, while South Africa’s 
role in peacekeeping missions in the continent are consistent with the post-apartheid 
principles of promotion of human rights, democracy and the like, there is a clear shift in 
its foreign policy with regard to Zimbabwe’s land policy. Id. 
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1.  Nelson Mandela’s Presidency: African-ness & South 
Africa’s relations with Nigeria 
During Nelson Mandela’s presidency, the execution of Ken Saro-
Wiwa (Nigerian environmental activist), was one of the major post-
apartheid foreign policy contentions of African-ness for South Africa.97 
At the beginning of the Saro-Wiwa crisis, South Africa’s policy towards 
Nigeria was based on ‘constructive engagement,’ which Mandela 
summarized as, “[m]y own approach is to be in direct contact with them . 
. . I do not think, from my own point of view, I can call for sanctions at 
this stage. If persuasion does not succeed, it will be time to consider 
other options.” 98 South Africa’s constructive engagement failed to halt 
Saro-Wiwa execution.99 This led critics to draw similarities between 
South Africa’s policy of constructive engagement and Margaret 
Thatcher’s policies towards apartheid South Africa, where, during 
apartheid era, the term ‘constructive engagement’ became synonymous 
with lip service.100 Unlike Thatcher’s policy towards apartheid, South 
Africa’s policy towards Nigeria took a major turn after the execution of 
  
 97. See generally Kenule Beeson Saro-Wiwa, Final Statement from Nigeria, 5 
STANDARDS INT’L J. MULTICULT. STUD. (1996) available at http://www.colorado.edu/ 
journals/standards/V5N2/ESSAYS/wiwa.html. Saro-Wiwa was arrested for his peaceful 
protests against multinational oil companies, such as Shell, which played a devastating 
role in damaging the ecology of the lands of the Ogoni people in Nigeria. Ed Pilkington, 
Shell Pays Out $15.5m Over Saro-Wiwa Killing, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2009), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/08/nigeria-usa. As a result of his activism 
he was condemned to death and executed on Nov. 10, 1995. Saro-Wiwa, supra. 
 98. Jack McKinney, Mandela Missed a Chance to Save Nigerian Dissident, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 17, 1995), http://articles.philly.com/1995-11-17/news/25682842 
_1_ken-saro-wiwa-mandela-ogoni. 
 99. Howard W. French, Nigeria Executes Critic Of Regime; Nations Protest, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/11/world/nigeria-
executes-critic-of-regime-nations-protest.html?pagewanted=all. 
 100. James Barber, The Commonwealth, Nigeria and South Africa, 5 S. AFR. INST. 
INT’L AFF., 1, 2 (1997) (discussing constructive engagement of South Africa and its 
similarities with western policies towards apartheid South Africa); Gavin Evans, 
Margaret Thatcher’s Shameful Support for Apartheid, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 
2013), http://mg.co.za/article/2013-04-19-00-margaret-thatchers-shameful-support-for-
apartheid (discussing constructive engagement as practiced by Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan in relation to apartheid South Africa). 
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Saro-Wiwa, when it advocated for sanctions against Nigeria.101 
Nonetheless, South Africa’s foreign policy towards Nigeria was subject 
to criticism; activists criticized ‘constructive engagement’ for its timidity 
while at the same time African states criticized South Africa’s call for 
sanctions as defiant of African Solidarity.102 Several members of the 
African Union saw Nigeria as a continental leader and “accused Mandela 
of breaking African unity.”103 Even amidst Nigeria’s reactions to 
Mandela’s condemnation of Saro-Wiwa, incidents were mixed: for 
instance, Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr., spokesman for Nigerian President 
Goodluck Jonathan, noted how South Africa’s foreign policy towards 
Nigeria was rather timid.104 On the other hand, some Nigerians were not 
only dismayed by South Africa’s position towards Nigeria, but even 
went further to identify South Africa as “a white state with a black 
head.”105  
South Africa’s experience with the Saro-Wiwa incident raises several 
descriptive accounts of norms of solidarity. First, South Africa as a 
“born-again” African state needs to constantly pledge its allegiance and 
observance of norms of solidarity. South Africa’s African-ness is, in 
general, subject to more contestation. States that have lent a hand in the 
  
 101. Barber, supra note 96, at 1084 (discussing that, although all Nigeria received 
was suspension of its membership in the Common Wealth, Mandela called for more, 
including economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation as a result of Nigeria’s defiance of 
international human rights norms). 
 102. Id. (discussing Liberia’s criticism of how South Africa reacted against 
Nigeria). 
 103. Id. (discussing how other African states did not view Nigeria as a human 
rights abuser, but rather as a continental leader, supporter of liberation movements, and 
major contributor to OAU). 
 104. Heidi Vogt, Mandela Leaves Divided Legacy in Africa, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 
2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303497804579241800418069602 
(speaking of Mandela, Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr. said, “[w]e felt he’d failed us”); see also Ken 
Wiwa, We Nigerians are Celebrating Mandela as the Kind of Hero We’ve Never Had: 
There is No Doubt We Envy South Africa for Mandela’s Iconic Profile and Global Status, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/08/ken-
wiwa-on-nigeria-response-to-mandela (discussing how Mandela was a paradox for 
human rights activists). 
 105. Barber, supra note 96, at 1084 (discussing Nigeria’s reaction to South 
Africa’s condemnation of Nigeria). 
698 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.3 
 
anti-apartheid struggle or decolonization projects of Africa maintain their 
African-ness despite their actions. For instance, calling for an audit of 
Zimbabwe’s election, Botswana broke what Simon Allison calls the 
“unwritten rule of African diplomacy.”106 In the same way, Botswana has 
condemned several other African states and their leaders, including 
Libya’s Muammar Gadaffi and Sudan’s Omar Al-Bashir.107 Unlike South 
Africa, however, Botswana’s African-ness was not subject to 
examination.  
A second possible explanation for the contestation of South Africa’s 
“born-again” African-ness, is not the result of South Africa’s historical 
wrongs, but rather the foreign policy tools - persuasion, constructive 
engagement, sanctions—it employed. But what are foreign policy tools 
of African-ness? How do ‘norms of solidarity’ effect behavioral changes 
among African states? Does African-ness condemn sanctions? Indeed, 
South Africa’s initial policy of “constructive engagement,” during the 
Saro-Wiwa incident, did not result in contestation of South Africa’s 
African-ness. Criticisms against South Africa arose after South Africa 
called for economic and political sanctions against Nigeria.108  
So, does this mean that African-ness condemns sanctions? Certainly, 
South Africa is not the only country to call for sanctions against another 
African state. For instance, several African states, backed by the 
  
 106. Simon Allison, Analysis: Ian Khama’s Renegade Foreign Policy Makes Him 
a Lonely Figure in Africa, DAILY MAVERICK (Aug. 8, 2013),  
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-08-08-analysis-ian-khamas-renegade-
foreign-policy-makes-him-a-lonely-figure-in-africa/#.UzSeql7_seN  
(discussing Botswana breaking the unwritten rule of African diplomacy). 
 107. Botswana condemns the African Union on Sudan’s al Bashir, FACE OF 
MALAWI (June 16, 2012), http://www.faceofmalawi.com/2012/06/botswana-condemns-
the-african-union-on-sudans-al-bashir/ (Botswana, standing in solidarity with Malawi, 
condemned the decision of the African Union to move the meeting site from Malawi to 
Ethiopia, since the former denied entry to Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir. 
“Botswana condemns this action as it is inconsistent with the very fundamental principles 
of democracy, human rights and good governance espoused by the AU, and which 
Malawi upholds,” reads the statement.”); see also Wene Owino, Botswana Seeks Gaddafi 
Departure, Welcomes Gbagbo Capture, AFR. REV. (Apr. 13, 2011), 
http://www.africareview.com/News/-/979180/1143582/-/hp9sqjz/-/index.html (discussing 
how Botswana condemned Gaddafi’s violence against peaceful protesters). 
 108. See generally Barber, supra note 96. 
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Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and African 
Union (AU) called for sanctions against Eritrea for its support of Al-
Shabab in Somalia.109 The African-ness of the states that called for 
sanctions on Eritrea was not questioned. Therefore, African-ness does 
not restrict foreign policy tools and norms of solidarity accepts both 
persuasion and sanctions as a means of effecting change. 
The third possible explanation for contestation of South Africa’s 
African-ness is that African-ness prohibits interference in internal affairs 
of AU member states.110 The idea of a brother-hood of African states 
solidifies norms of non-interference, along with norms of racial equality 
and independence of states, as constituting norms of African solidarity.111 
Norms of solidarity provide for ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ as 
the latter meets the wants and accords of African-ness.112 The debate is 
whether South Africa’s reaction to the Saro-Wiwa incident and Eritrea’s 
support for terrorist groups amounts to interference in internal affairs of 
Nigeria and Somalia, respectively. It seems that, for the African 
community, Eritrea and South Africa both breached norms of non-
interference, leading African states to react within the realms of norms of 
solidarity. Alternatively, the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool 
  
 109. See generally S.C. Res. 1907, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1907 (Dec. 23, 2009) 
(discussing the call of the AU and AU member states to impose sanctions on Eritrea for 
its role in Somalia and refusal to withdraw troops from disputed areas with Djibouti). 
 110. A.U. Charter art. 4, para. g (“The Union shall function in accordance with the 
following principles . . . non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of 
another.”); see generally Paul D. Williams, From Non-Intervention to Non-Difference: 
The Origins and Development of the African Union’s Security Culture, 106 AFR. AFF. 
253 (2007) (generally discussing norms of non-interference in internal affairs of member 
states among African Union). See also A. Bolaji Akinyemi, The Organization of African 
Unity and the Concept of Non-interference in Internal Affairs of Member States, 46 BRIT. 
Y. B. INT’L L. 393, 394 (1972-73) (quoting Justice T. O. Elias’s conception of non-
interference as “the desire to be left alone, to be allowed to choose one’s particular 
political, economic and social systems and to order the life of one’s community in one’s 
own way”). 
 111. See, e.g., Charter of the Organization of African Unity, Sept. 13, 1963, 479 
U.N.T.S. 39 (“Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among our 
peoples and cooperation among our states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for 
brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national 
differences.”). 
 112. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 6, art. 3 para. a. 
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appear to be permissible under norms of solidarity. In conclusion, South 
Africa’s African-ness was questioned because it broke norms of non-
interference in internal affairs as constitutive norms of solidarity among 
African states.  
2.  Mbeki and Zuma: African-ness & South Africa’s 
Relations with Zimbabwe 
In the post Saro-Wiwa period, South Africa’s foreign policy choices 
towards other African states were based on ‘norms of non-interference’ 
as integral to norms of solidarity. Chris Alden and Millis Soko offer an 
alternative explanation, arguing that South Africa’s policies following 
the Saro-Wiwa crisis are the result of South Africa’s penance for its 
historical wrongs.113 Yet Alden and Soko failed to explain why other 
Southern African states, in accordance with South Africa, followed 
‘quiet diplomacy’ against Zimbabwe.114 For example, while Zambia 
galvanized anti-apartheid stance in Africa, its contemporary policies 
towards Zimbabwe’s land policy are not dramatically different from 
South Africa’s.115  
Others, for instance Ceila W. Dugger and Barry Bearak, reason that 
South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe, especially during 
Mbeki’s presidency, was the result of Mbeki’s personal relationship with 
Mugabe, rather than South Africa’s sacrament for its historical 
mistakes.116 For Dugger and Bearak, “constructive engagement” 
  
 113. Chris Alden & Millis Soko, South Africa’s Economic Relations with Africa: 
Hegemony and its Discontents, 43 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 367, 379 (2005) (discussing South 
African regional diplomacy and how it has focused on building consensus to rectify 
historical wrongs). 
 114. See generally Victoria Graham, How Firm the Handshake? South Africa’s 
Use of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006, 15 AFR. SEC. REV. 114 (2006) 
(discussing the concept of ‘quiet diplomacy’ in relation to South Africa’s foreign policy 
towards Zimbabwe). 
 115. Lift Zim Sanctions – Chikwanda, LUSAKATIMES.COM (Aug. 6, 2013), 
http://www.lusakatimes.com/2013/08/06/lift-zim-sanctions-chikwanda/ (discussing 
Zambia’s call for sanctions against Zimbabwe to be lifted). 
 116. See Ceila W. Dugger & Barry Bearak, Complex Ties Lead Ally Not to 
Condemn Mugabe, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/ 
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stemmed from personal kinships and relationships of Southern African 
leaders, rather than from norms of solidarity or African-ness.117  
Despite the personal relationships that exist between Mbeki and 
Mugabe, Mbeki’s uncompromising reaction to western critics of 
Zimbabwe’s election is a question of African integrity, where Africans 
have the ultimate power and responsibility to define their future. Mbeki 
argued, “[w]e have a common responsibility as Africans to determine our 
destiny and are quite ready to stand up against anybody else who thinks 
that, ‘never mind what the thousand African observers say about 
elections in Zimbabwe, we sitting in Washington and London are wiser 
than they are.’”118 Moreover, Mbeki contended that Zimbabwe’s land 
policy is an internal matter, which does not warrant South Africa’s 
interference.119 In addition, post-Mbeki, South Africa has not only 
showed support for Zimbabwe, but also called for sanctions against the 
latter to be lifted.120 For instance, Lindiwe Zulu, South African President 
Jacob Zuma’s foreign policy advisor, noted, “It’s not just Zimbabwe 
  
world/africa/27mbeki.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, (discussing the special bond between 
Mugabe and Mbeki). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Murithi Mutiga, Why Zimbabwe Sanctions Boomerang, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/opinion/mutiga-why-zimbabwe-sanctions- 
boomerang.html (quoting Mbeki). 
 119. Thabo Mbeki Blasts Mugabe’s ‘Chaotic’ Land Reform, BULAWAYO24 (Aug. 
28, 2013), http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-35298.html. Mbeki 
noted,  
The way the land reform was done offended other players in the 
world. I told them [Mugabe and Zanu-PF], they could not listen; 
they did what they wanted with their own country. They set a bad 
example which we don’t want any country in Africa to follow. So 
they must pay a price. I think this is the reason why, apart from 
diamonds, there is too much attention on Zimbabwe.  
Id. Mbeki did not publicly criticize Zimbabwe’s land policy; rather, it was leaked 
documents that showed his personal frustration with Mugabe and ZANU-PF. See David 
Blair, Zimbabwe: Robert Mugabe Warned by Thabo Mbeki at African Union Summit, 
TELEGRAPH (June 30, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/2223643/Zimbabwe-Robert-Mugabe-warned-by-Thabo-
Mbeki-at-African-Union-summit.html. 
 120. See Zimbabwe: South Africa Wants Anti-Zim Sanctions Lifted, THE HERALD 
(June 15, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201206160268.html (quoting Lindiwe Zulu). 
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that’s saying the sanctions are not working. The entire continent is saying 
that.”121  
In short, foreign policy formation in South Africa is based on norms 
of solidarity. The actions and behavior of South Africa following the 
Saro-Wiwa incident show the value of norms of solidarity and its tenants, 
such as ‘non-interference in internal affairs,’ in shaping the ethos and 
formation of foreign relations in Africa. South Africa’s policy towards 
Nigeria during the Saro-Wiwa incident and the major shift in its policy 
towards Zimbabwe are not penance for its historical wrongs. Rather, they 
are the result of acceptance of norms of solidarity and ‘norms of non-
interference.’ In addition, if South Africa’s behavior is an attempt to 
rectify its historical wrongs, one might wonder why allies of apartheid 
regime are free from paying penance for past wrongs? To be more 
specific, why was Malawi, which sympathized with apartheid South 
Africa, not required to prove its African-ness.122 In addition, why are 
South Africa-Zimbabwe relations similar to Zambia-Zimbabwe 
relations? Zambia, which was not only anti-apartheid, but also hosted 
and funded anti-apartheid movements, followed a similar, if not 
identical, policy as South Africa in its relations with Zimbabwe.123 
Therefore, what those examples show is that African-ness, or norms of 
solidarity, strongly prohibit interference in the internal affairs of other 
African states.  
  
 121. Id. 
 122. See generally Eugenio Njoloma, A Study of Intra-African Relations: An 
Analysis of the Factors informing the Foreign Policy of Malawi towards Zimbabwe 
(Nov. 2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Rhodes University). During the apartheid era 
Malawi defined its foreign relations in alignment with South Africa. Id. at 10. Deviating 
from the accepted norm of African states towards apartheid South Africa, which was 
deep-rooted condemnation, Malawi called for cooperation with white ruled South Africa. 
Id. at 10, 21. This led to a lot of bickering between the then President Banda of Malawi 
and his African counterparts. Id. at 22. Nevertheless, Malawi did not have to go through 
re-emersion or re-baptism in African-ness as South Africa did. Id. at 26. In its post-
apartheid foreign policy Malawi’s penance was, for instance, honoring President Mugabe 
by renaming a major road after him, which reflects Malawi’s turn to solidarity as the 
unspoken rule of African foreign policy Id. at 60. 
 123. Lift Zim Sanctions – Chikwanda, supra note 115. 
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C.   Norms of Solidarity and Regional Integration Arrangements 
The discussions on norms of solidarity above mainly deal with the 
practice of individual member states rather than Southern African states 
as a group. This leaves lingering questions such as, how are norms of 
solidarity practiced at regional level? Are norms of solidarity, as organic 
practices of individual member states, entrenched in regional integration 
practices? Given the fact that Southern African states belong to three 
regional integration arrangements—SADC, COMESA and EAC—one 
might wonder how and where solidarity arrangements lie. For instance, 
since Tanzania is member of both SADC and EAC, Tanzania has 
multiple solidarity arrangements with both EAC and SADC member 
states.124 In this context, Tanzania has solidarity arrangements with both 
Kenya and South Africa. So the question is whether this would translate 
into a solidarity arrangement between Kenya and South Africa, even 
though neither Kenya nor South Africa belong to SADC and EAC 
respectively.125 To be specific, because Kenya belongs to the same 
regional arrangements as Tanzania, EAC, can one conclude that there is 
a solidarity arrangement between Kenya and member states of all 
regional integration arrangements that Tanzania is a member of?126 
Alternatively, what are the relationships between member states and the 
community regarding the application of norms of solidarity?  
The historical background of regionalism in the African continent is 
rooted in emancipatory aspirations of its member states, which led to 
continental feelings of African-ness. Although regional integration 
involves solidarity arrangements among African states, one should note 
that the practice and existence of solidarity arrangements among African 
states exists beyond the confines of regionalism and membership in 
integration schemes. Fundamental to the relationship between norms of 
  
 124. See SADC Member States, SADC http://www.sadc.int/member-states/ (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2016), and EAC Member States, EAC http://www.eac.int/about/overview 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2016) (showing that Tanzania has membership both in SADC and 
EAC). 
 125. SADC Member States, supra note 124 (showing that Kenya is not a signatory 
to SADC); EAC Member States, supra note 124 (showing that South Africa is not a 
member of EAC). 
 126. EAC member states, supra note 124. 
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solidarity and regional integration arrangements in Africa is, therefore, 
the emancipatory project of the continent.127 As solidification of 
decolonization and anti-racial movements, therefore, norms of solidarity 
for Southern African states are agnostic to membership in regional or 
sub-regional grouping. 
III.   NORMS OF SOLIDARITY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Although norms of solidarity are intensely ideational concerns, 
particularly in the anti-apartheid and de-colonization struggles of the 
region, material concerns and particularly economic pressures are 
pressing issues in governing EU-Southern African relations. The EU has 
been criticized several times for disintegrating regional integration 
efforts of Southern African states.128 Looking at disintegration 
simplistically as members of Southern African community relinquishing 
their membership in SADC and joining COMESA is a practically and 
theoretically flawed measure of disintegration. First, with the ongoing 
negotiations for a tri-partite integration among SADC, COMESA and 
EAC, withdrawal from SADC does not have a long-term effect for 
regional and continental integration efforts.129 Second, sub-regional 
integration as a means to continental integration does not prescribe where 
and with which sub-regional grouping a state should belong for 
continental aspiration of integration to manifest.130 Third, theoretically 
  
 127. See generally Luwam Dirar, Rethinking and Theorizing Regional Integration 
in Southern Africa, 28 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 123 (2014) (discussing the relationship 
between continental and Southern African emancipation projects and regional integration 
arrangements). 
 128. See generally Stephen R. Hurt, The EU-SADC Economic Partnership 
Agreement Negotiations: ‘Locking-In’ the Neoliberal Development Model in Southern 
Africa?, 33 THIRD WORLD Q. 495 (2012) (arguing that the EU poses a threat to the 
coherence of regional integration policies of SADC). 
 129. See COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and 
Government, Kampala, Uganda, Oct. 22, 2008, Final Communique, art. 14(i) (discussing 
approval of the plan to form a tri-partite integration scheme among COMESA, EAC and 
SADC). 
 130. See id. at art. 11 (discussing the relationship between aspiration of the 
Tripartite Summit and African Economic Community). See also Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community art. 4(1)(d), June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241 (“The 
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the conceptual understanding of regional integration is a continental 
emancipatory project that has origins and spirit beyond the confines of 
membership in integration schemes. In this context, among Southern 
African states, regional integration was nothing but a solidification of 
norms of solidarity for continental decolonization and racial equality 
movements.  
This part attempts to understand how norms of solidarity fare under 
economic pressures. The welfare mentality of trade liberalization in 
European foreign policy is used as a test, which allows one to understand 
the function, and role of norms of solidarity in defining foreign relations 
of Southern African states towards the former. The central argument of 
this section is that economic pressures that threaten revenue, and market 
access for Southern African states leads to the degeneration of norms of 
solidarity. For Southern African states in EPA negotiations, issues of 
access to European markets have overshadowed concerns of Southern 
African states. This fear, and the end of white racial and colonial 
domination, resulted in lack of emphasis for common ideational concerns 
among Southern African states.  
It is relevant to put some disclaimers before advancing further in 
substantive discussions of EU-Southern African states. From the 1960s 
until now, the narrative of EU-Africa trade relations, where the wealthy, 
developed Europe, and the poor, developing states of Africa entered into 
trade agreements, to the detriment of the latter, dominated scholarship.131 
There exists structural economic inequality between the EU and African 
  
objectives of the Community shall be . . . to coordinate and harmonize policies among 
existing and future economic communities in order to foster the gradual establishment of 
the Community.”). Likewise, apart from advocating for gradual continental integration 
and using sub-regional groupings as building blocks for continental community, there is 
no requirement that a state should belong to one integration scheme and not the other. See 
id. at art. 6 (discussing modalities for the establishment of the Community). 
 131. This discourse was part of the global discourse on North-South divide, where 
the North has framed multilateral, regional or bilateral trade deals to further its interests 
at the detriment of interests of developing South. See THE CHALLENGE TO THE SOUTH: 
THE REPORT OF THE SOUTH COMMISSION 216 (1990) (“[T]he negotiations that have taken 
place, notably the Uruguay Round on trade, have been called by the North, with an 
agenda devised to further its global interests. They have been imposed by the North on 
the South.”). 
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states, which if evaluated and compared to the current status of inequality 
gap, is higher than the gap that existed in the 1960s.132 However, the 
parameters of the North-South engagement in EU-Africa relations have 
changed slightly. To start with, the idea of a developed North in the 
context of the EU, particularly with its expansion from its original core-
members, has created its own internal South.133 Second, the idea of the 
South in the context of Southern-African states has changed and 
produced its own internal North.134 Understanding these limitations of 
North-South discourse, the focus in this section is not to reintroduce 
North-South dialogue in the context of EU-Southern African states 
relations, but rather to test the relationship between economic relations 
and norms of solidarity.  
To understand the relationship between economic relations and norms 
of solidarity, it seems relevant to explore current trends of trade flows 
between both trading partners and its impact on the global fair trade 
movement. New International Economic Order (NIEO) as a negotiation 
process represents the aspirations and goals of Southern African states in 
  
 132. Max Fisher, The Hidden Cost of Inequality: Migrants Who Die on the 
Journey from Poor to Rich Countries, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/10/07/the-hidden-cost-of-
inequality-migrants-who-die-on-the-journey-from-poor-to-rich-countries/ (“‘And of 
course these income gaps, historically, have risen tremendously, despite the fact that in 
the last 15 or 20 years, China and India have grown at very high rates. Still, the number 
of countries in Africa where income today is lower than in the 1960s [when they won 
independence] is large, I think about 15 countries. So, clearly, the gap between Africa 
and Europe has increased.’” (quoting Branco Milanovic)). 
 133. See, e.g., Damjan Kukovec, A Critique of the Rhetoric of Common Interest in 
the European Union Legal Discourse, (Apr. 13, 2012) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2178332 (using center-periphery discourse in this piece, 
Kukovec argues that although all are members of EU, states like Germany and France are 
examples of the center within the union and states like Portugal, Greece and Hungary 
make examples of states in the periphery of EU). 
 134. Here, a good example would be the economic disparity between, for instance, 
South Africa and Lesotho. Where if one was to use North-South, alternatively Center-
Periphery discourse to understand economic relations among Southern African states. In 
other words, one would consider South Africa to be the north of Southern African states 
while states like Lesotho represent the south or the region. 
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unequal global economic order.135 By creating a more equitable global 
economic order, the NIEO eases economic pressures through the creation 
of flexible mechanisms to accommodate policy spaces of developing 
states.136 Historical relationships of third-world states with unequal 
global economic order, which failed to transform modes of production 
and global value chain relationships, led to third-world consensus for 
reform of global trade relations.137 Reform of global economic order, a 
call for fair trade rules from third-world states, is exemplified in several 
examples, some of which include a call for flexibility in implementation 
of trade rules, and preferential treatment for goods originating from 
third-world states. The most recent round of negotiations for fair trade, 
Doha Development Round, with initiation of third-world states to 
negotiate more concessions and preferences in their favor, was a 
continuation of NIEO.138 The current negotiations for EU-Southern 
Africa trade relations however, have the effect of eliminating preferential 
treatment for Southern-African products in EU markets. Therefore, one 
can argue that EPAs, if and when signed, have the power of sustaining 
  
 135. In this context, reference to NIEO is as a negotiation process. Robert W. Cox, 
Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflections on Some Recent 
Literature, 33 INT’L ORG. 257, 258 (1979) (“[T]he NIEO is a negotiation process, broadly 
speaking, between countries of North and South but taking place through a variety of 
institutions and forums in which are represented wider or narrower ranges of functional 
and geographical interests. This negotiation process is concerned with the possibilities of 
agreement concerning both revised international policies and reformed or new institutions 
(including the power relationships governing these institutions).”). Cox noted that there 
are four levels of understanding of the NIEO and five opinion clusters. Id. at 259–65. 
 136. See generally Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy 
Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 405 
(2005) (discussing the role of special and differential treatment in allowing developing 
states to cope with the impact of WTO sponsored globalization). 
 137. This line of argument, a critique of the global trading system that has failed to 
transform modes of production and global value chain relationships, is similar to the 
historical materialist school of thought as analyzed by Robert Cox. For Cox, the school of 
historical materialist, which includes such scholars as Samir Amin, is an ideology of the 
NIEO movement. Cox, supra note 135, at 266. 
 138. As a result of third world states insistence for a more development oriented 
global economic order, global trade liberalization negotiations are at a stalemate at the 
moment. See Hoekman, supra note 136, at 419–21. 
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unequal global order and eroding the reforms and landmarks of NIEO, 
however limited NIEO’s reforms might have been.139  
To prevent erosion of NIEOs, in contemporary trade negotiations 
between the EU and Southern African states, solidarity arrangements 
among the latter could play a positive role for sustaining and advancing 
concerns of fair trade. From a negotiation perspective, unlike the current 
fragmented approach, united Southern African states would benefit on 
regional and global fair economic order movements.140 Nkrumah 
eloquently noted, how “[a] single representation, resting on the strength 
of a whole continent, would be more positive in its influence than all the 
separate representations of the African states put together.”141 Nkrumah’s 
call for single representation for Africa is based on norms of solidarity, 
  
 139. For a similar argument but at a broader global economic order issue, see 
James Thuo Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 184, 203–05 
(1998) (reviewing SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1996); SIBA N’ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI-SOVEREIGNS AND 
AFRICANS: RACE AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996) (discussing 
how third world aspirations for NIEO might have already died)). This statement implies 
that trade liberalization or eradication of NIEO is detrimental for development projects of 
developing countries. This view is held for multiple reasons. For instance, the global 
liberalization project has successfully limited developed states imposing liberalization on 
third world states while they themselves practice pick and choose protectionism. Hence, 
NIEO to a certain degree, by providing flexibility of global economic order regulations, 
left a birthing space for development policies among developing states. 
 140. See generally Gabriel Cepaluni, Manoel Galdino & Amâncio Jorge de 
Oliveira, The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO, 6 BRAZ. POL. SCI. REV. 28 
(2012) (arguing that since the WTO works through consensus, negotiating in numbers 
has a positive contribution in shifting or leveling unequal negotiating platform in 
international economic order). But see generally Peter Drahos, When the Weak Bargain 
with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization, 8 INT’L NEGOTIATION 79 
(2003) (arguing that the source of bargaining power in multilateral negotiations is 
eschewed towards the developed North and noting that the idea of strength in numbers 
does not always level the negotiation platform). 
 141. KWAME NKRUMAH, AFRICA MUST UNITE, 195 (1963) (For Nkrumah one of 
the positive outcomes of African Unity is the possibility of speaking with one voice 
instead of each African state having to fend for itself.). See also generally James Thou 
Gathii, The High Stakes of WTO Reform, 6 MICH. L. REV. 1361 (2006) (reviewing 
FATOUMA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD 
OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS/ THE LESSONS OF CANCUN (2004) (discussing how developing 
countries through unity could be effective in their WTO trade negotiations)). 
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where concerns of all African states are presented in the particular 
negotiating platform with the combined voting power of all African 
states. For instance, Nkrumah explains how the role of concerted 
pressure of African states elevated Africa’s anti-colonization movement 
to the global platform.142 However, Africa’s contemporary lack of 
common foreign policy resulted in fragmented negotiation syndrome, 
where African states negotiate individually and outside their regional 
groupings.143 In the Southern African context, negotiations with the EU 
fall in four camps: under COMESA, EAC, CEMAC and SADC.144 In 
addition to the fragmented sub-regional grouping in EPA negotiations, 
each Southern African state continues to guard its ability to conduct an 
independent foreign policy towards the EU.145 This produces the 
  
 142. See Nkrumah, supra note 141, at 196–97. Nkrumah gives several examples of 
how the power of ideas of African states changed the atmosphere and moral stance of the 
UN in the anti-apartheid and decolonization project. Id. He summarized African role in 
spreading the power of ideas as the reason why the position of the great powers and UN 
has shifted towards colonialism. Id. He concluded, “[n]othing like this busy concern with 
the African surge for freedom could ever have happened without the concerted pressure 
of the newly independent states within the world organization of nations.” Id. 
 143. Fragmented negotiation syndrome is allowed under the SADC Treaty. Treaty 
of the Southern African Development Community, supra note 7,, art. 24 para. 1 (“Subject 
to the provisions of Article 6(1), Member States and SADC shall maintain good working 
relations and other forms of cooperation, and may enter into agreements with other states, 
regional and international organisations, whose objectives are compatible with the 
objectives of SADC and the provisions of this Treaty.”).  
 144. The following states negotiated under SADC: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa. Overview of EPA Negotiations, 
EUR. COMM’N., available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/ 
tradoc_144912.pdf (last updated Feb. 2016). Tanzania and DRC negotiated under EAC 
and CEMAC respectively. Id. Zambia, Zimbabwe, Seychelles, Madagascar, Malawi and 
Mauritius negotiated under COMESA. Id. 
 145. This is particularly visible, in the case of Zimbabwe, with a possible mission 
of appeasing the West in general and the EU in particular although under sanctions from 
the EU, initialed interim EPA in September 2009. See Zimbabwe, EU sign interim EPA 
treaty, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/ 
fzsz/qyhz/t607835.htm. Zimbabwe’s initialization of EPA could also be the result of 
Zimbabwe’s fear of losing access to EU markets as much as it is for sanctions to be lifted. 
Id. Like Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique (BLSM), for 
similar reasons as Zimbabwe and obviously without a need to “appease” the EU, were 
among the early signatories to interim EPAs. Id. Nevertheless, despite the fear and need 
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lingering puzzles of the role and value of norms of solidarity in 
contemporary Africa in general, and Southern African states in 
particular.146  
A.   Reality of EU-Southern African States Trade Relations 
Evaluating contemporary trade between the EU and Southern African 
states gives four major perceptions of the impact and types of 
relationships that exists between both trading partners. First, Southern 
African states’ trade deficit or surplus is not based on whether the 
particular Southern African state is a beneficiary of the EU’s preferential 
treatment for developing states. Since some states benefit from the EU’s 
Everything But Arms (EBA) and Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSPs) initiatives, one could argue that they have better opportunities in 
accessing European markets.147 Several scholars, however, showed that 
the impact of preferential treatment for developing states in improving 
market access of those states is contestable.148 For instance, among 
  
to appease, what is common to all those five states (Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and Mozambique) is that in their respective EPAs all of them have not agreed 
on certain contentious issues such as: export taxes and extending most favored nation 
(MFN) treatment to the EU. Id. 
 146. The puzzle is not so much the result of negotiations in different regional and 
sub-regional integration agreements. On the contrary, as explained earlier, norms of 
solidarity are not dependent on membership to a particular integration scheme. The 
puzzle here is whether African states will be able to maintain their solidarity 
commitments compartmentalized to one sub-regional grouping or not. The question is 
should they keep their solidarity arrangements compartmentalized? 
 147. The EBA initiative of the EU is an arrangement for least developed states, 
which provides duty free and quota free access for all products except for arms. See 
Everything But Arms (EPA) – who benefits?, EUR. COMM’N. (Apr. 30, 2013), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150983.pdf. GSP initiatives allow 
developing states’ exporters lower or no duty in order to facilitate their access to EU 
markets. 
 148. See Paul Brenton, Integrating the Least Developed Countries into the World 
Trading System: The Current Impact of European Union Preferences under “Everything 
But Arms” 20–21 (World Bank Policy Res., Working Paper No. 3018, 2003) (noting that 
although the impact of EBAs is state specific and with considerable variation, one could 
argue that its overall impact is relatively minor. This is partly because the EU has one of 
the highest liberalized tariff regimes and restrictive rules of origin laws). See also 
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Southern African states, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland benefit from 
the EU’s GSP initiative and all have surplus against the EU.149 Similarly, 
Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, 
and Zambia are beneficiaries of EBA initiatives.150 As shown in Table 1, 
out of these eight beneficiaries of EBAs in the region, only Tanzania and 
Zambia have trade deficit with the EU. Unfortunately, the existence of 
trade surplus by, for instance Angola against the EU, does not mean that 
EBAs have had a positive trade creation effect for Angola. On the 
contrary, as shown in Table 2, Angola’s trade surplus is the result of 
increasing demand for oil from Europe. Moreover, since all beneficiaries 
of EBAs do not have trade surplus against the EU, one can conclude that 
for Southern African states, preferential treatment does not necessarily 
convert to trade surplus against the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
generally Lucian Cernat et al., The EU’s Everything but Arms Initiative and the Least-
developed Countries (World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 47, 2003) 
(by using a computable general equilibrium simulation model, the authors show that the 
impact of EBAs on the EU are minimal, and as a result of EBAs, the welfare of sub-
Saharan African states increases to the detriment of other developing states). See also 
Marcel Adenäuer et al., Impact of the “Everything but Arms” Initiative on the EU Sugar 
Sub-sector 27-28, (CAPRI, Working Paper No. 05-03, 2003) (through the EBA initiative 
and its impact on sugar trade in EU, the authors of this piece argued that the EU’s sugar 
imports from least developed states increased while its sugar exports decreased). 
 149. EU Publishes Revised Preferential Import Scheme for Developing Countries, 
EUR. COMM’N, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=840 (last updated Oct. 
31, 2012) (discussing the different system of preferences and list of beneficiaries). 
 150. Commission Delegated Regulation 1421/2013, Amending Annexes I, II and 
IV to Regulation 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council applying a 
scheme of generalized tariff preferences, Annex III, 2013 O.J. (L 355) 1,13 (list of EBA 
beneficiaries). 
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 Total Trade EU Imports EU Exports EU Trade 
Balance 
South Africa 40023 15537 24486 8948 
Angola 15518 9311 6207 -3104 
Botswana 4406 3442 964 -2478 
DRC 2197 1135 1062 -72 
Mozambique 2166 1332 834 -499 
Mauritius 1944 1086 858 -229 
Namibia 1695 942 753 -188 
Tanzania 1457 525 932 408 
Madagascar 1273 738 535 -196 
Zambia 1023 453 570 117 
Zimbabwe 627 387 240 -147 
Seychelles 610 294 316 22 
Malawi 394 223 171 -53 
Swaziland 253 230 23 -208 
Lesotho 202 187 15 -172 
 
Table 1: EU’s trade balance with Southern African states in million Euros.151 
Second, existent trade deficit could be the result of a liberalized trade 
relationship between South Africa and the EU.152 As shown in Table 1, 
  
 151. This table is constructed from data compiled by the European Commission 
that deals with Client and Supplier Countries of the EU28 in Merchandise Trade in 
Goods with African Countries (2013). A deficit of 15 bn euro in EU28 trade in goods 
with Africa in 2013, EUROSTAT NEWS RELEASE (Mar.28, 2014) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-press-releases/-/6-28032014-AP. Note that the 
EU’s trade balance with Botswana was not available on the date. Id. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this study, the EU’s trade balance with Botswana has been calculated by 
deducting EU’s exports from imports. 
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South Africa, the biggest economy among Southern African states, has 
the highest trade deficit with the EU. All Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) states, with the exception of South Africa, have trade 
surplus in their trade with the EU.153 SACU member states as a group, in 
their total trade with the EU, have 5,902 million euros trade deficit. 
Several explanations are worth mentioning here. To start with, as a result 
of the free trade agreement between South Africa and the EU, the latter’s 
produce receive liberalized access to the South African market.154 Access 
to the South African market for European produce, indirectly extends 
beyond the confines of South Africa’s territory to all SACU member 
states.155 This is because South Africa is a member of the SACU, as a 
  
 152. EU–Southern African Trade is governed by the Trade and Development 
Cooperation Agreement. See Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement, EU–S. 
Afr., Oct. 11, 1999, O.J. (L 311).  
 153. For a history of SACU see generally P. M. Landell-Mills, The 1969 Southern 
African Customs Union Agreement, 9 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 263 (1971) (discussing the 
colonial legacies of SACU agreement and its profit sharing modalities through time). 
SACU is comprised of South Africa, Swaziland, Namibia, Lesotho, and Botswana. Id. It 
is the oldest customs Union in the world. Id.  
 154. Catherine Grant, Southern Africa and the European Union: The TDCA and 
SADC EPA 3–4 (TRALAC, Trade Brief No. 1, 2006) (discussing how South Africa is 
actually in the losing side as a result of the TDCA). As a result of trade liberalization of 
TDCA the EU and South Africa are required to eliminate tariffs on 95% and 86% of 
currently trade goods. Id. at 3. The impacts of such liberalization are “EU tariff changes 
affect only 25% of current trade goods and their weighted average tariff is only 2.7%. 
South African tariff changes affect 40% of currently traded goods in a context of a 
weighted average tariff of 10%.” Id. 
 155. Southern African Customs Union Agreement art. 2(a), Oct. 21, 2002, 
available at http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/SACU.pdf [hereinafter 
SACU Treaty] (stating that one of the objectives of the organization is free movement of 
goods between and among the member states). See also Trade Policy Review Body, 
supra note 78. Similarly see Lesotho’s Consumer Inflation: A Closer Look at Numbers, 
CENTRAL BANK OF LESOTHO ECONOMIC REVIEW (Mar. 2012),  
http://www.centralbank.org.ls/publications/MonthlyEconomicReviews/2012/March%202
012%20ER.pdf (discussing how South African economy affects economy of Lesotho). 
For a similar example on Swaziland see Christopher Vandome et. al., Swaziland: 
Southern Africa’s Forgotten Crisis, (Sept. 2013), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/ 
files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20130900SwazilandVa
ndomeVinesWeimer.pdf (discussing the impact of Swaziland’s dependence on SACU’s 
profit sharing system and South African economy on Swaziland’s economy). 
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result of which, there is free movement of goods between South Africa 
on the one hand, and Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland on the 
other.156  
Table 2: EU’s Merchandise Trade with S. African states by product breakdown in million euros.157 
  
 156. SACU Treaty, supra note 155. 
 FOOD & RAW 
MATERIALS 
FUELS CHEMICALS MACHINERY TEXTILE & 
CLOTHING 
OTHERS 
 Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp Imp Exp 
Angola 15 1265 8885 242 0 474 18 2317 0 114 392 1795 
Botswana 22 5 37 1 0 14 1 68 0 1 3382 875 
DRC 58 270 889 13 2 186 1 127 0 22 185 144 
Lesotho 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 9 1 0 185 4 
Madagascar 293 86 92 5 18 92 3 157 300 98 33 101 
Malawi 219 16 0 6 0 77 1 34 0 1 3 36 
Mauritius 617 216 31 6 15 94 14 247 278 37 130 262 
Mozam-
bique 
232 107 1066 12 0 90 3 396 1 10 29 219 
Namibia 370 32 356 233 104 24 5 393 0 2 106 69 
Seychelles 288 131 1 3 0 8 3 114 0 4 2 60 
South-
Africa 
2575 1524 4370 1049 734 3586 2742 12990 45 248 5078 5104 
Swaziland 211 4 0 1 12 6 0 7 0 0 7 5 
Tanzania 352 90 89 70 0 172 37 442 2 4 45 154 
Zambia 115 26 228 1 0 68 3 370 0 2 107 102 
Zimbabwe 221 15 20 2 0 25 1 156 3 2 143 41 
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Third, by looking at contemporary merchandise trade between 
Southern African states and the EU, one could conclude that it replicates 
classical narratives of North and South trade.158 Table 2 elaborates and 
categorizes merchandise trade between the EU and Southern African 
states. The breakdown of merchandise trade between the EU and 
Southern African states shows two trends. First, generally speaking, the 
EU has a trade deficit in fuel, food, and raw materials trade. In fuel trade, 
all Southern African states except Malawi, Seychelles, and Swaziland 
have trade surplus against the EU. For instance, Angola—the biggest fuel 
exporter from the Southern African states—has surplus approximately 
amounting to 95% with the EU.159 Likewise, the EU in food and raw 
materials trade has deficit against all Southern African states with the 
exception of Angola and DRC. Second, generally speaking when it 
comes to processed goods and sophisticated production of machinery and 
chemicals, the EU has surplus against Southern African states. For 
instance, in machinery trade, the EU has trade surplus against all 
  
 157. This table is constructed from data compiled by the European Commission on 
EU’s Merchandise Trade with Southern African states. See Statistics, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/statistics/index_en.htm (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2014). The product breakdown in this table is based on WTO categorization and 
Standard International Trade Classification. Id.  
 158. Classical trade in this section is understood as roles where states in the South 
are raw material exporters and states in the North export processed and manufactured 
material. It is also understood as what Paul Krugman’s theory of product cycle theory 
takes for granted, “product cycle in which it is taken as given that there is continuous 
introduction of new products in the developed region, the North; at the same time the less 
developed region, the South, learns in each period to produce some of the goods formerly 
produced only in the North.” David Dollar, Technological Innovation, Capital Mobility, 
and the Product Cycle in North-South Trade, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 177 (1986). For 
Krugman, a state’s terms of trade are improved when that particular state increases the 
range of products it can produce. Krugman’s theory is consistent with the history of 
economic development of South East Asian Tigers. Id. 
 159. The calculation for the percentage of fuel trade was done by the author by 
looking at specific details of trade flows between Angola and EU. For the year 2013, 
EU’s fuel import from Angola is 8,885 million Euros worth. Likewise, EU’s trade deficit 
against Angola in fuel trade is -8,643 million Euros. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, Angola, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_122071.pdf (last visited Jan. 
28, 2015). In short, when the overall EU’s imports from Angola are worth only 9,309 
million Euros, it is easy to see lack of diversified industry on the Angolan side. Id. 
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Southern African states. Similarly, as shown in Table 2, the EU has 
surplus in trade in chemicals with all Southern African states except 
Swaziland. 
 
EU Exports EU Imports 
 Million Euro  Million Euro 
USA  289.4 China 280.1 
Switzerland 169.1 Russia 206.9 
China 148.2 USA 199.6 
Russia 119.5 Switzerland 94.6 
Turkey 77.7 Norway 89.6 
Japan 54 Japan 56.6 
Norway 50.1 Turkey 50.7 
U.A.E. 44.6 India 36.8 
South Korea 39.9 South Korea 35.8 
Brazil 39.9 Brazil 33.3 
 
Table 3: EU-28 trade in goods leading trade partners, 2013 (million EUR)160 
Fourth, from the EU perspective, Southern African states are not 
significant trading partners. The EU’s main goods, supplies, and 
destinations are mostly found outside the Southern African hemisphere. 
As shown in Table 3, for the EU, USA, and China are the main export 
destinations, and import sources respectively. Although Southern African 
states are not the main trading partners for the EU, the EU remains the 
main trading partner for Southern African states. Between the years of 
  
 160. Data for this table is extracted from, EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU Trade in the 
World-Trade Statistics, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc 
_122532.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
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2000-2009, SADC exports to the EU represent an average of 26.3% of 
SADC’s exports to the world.161 For the same period, for EAC states with 
a slight increase from SADC records show an average export of 30.2% to 
the EU.162 Similarly for COMESA member states, half of all of their 
exports are destined for European markets.163 When it comes to imports, 
SADC states have the highest share of imports from the EU—an average 
of 31.8% of total world imports.164 In conclusion, given current realities 
of trade between both trading partners, do Southern African states have 
equal partnership with the EU? Or is the idea of partnership just 
customary platitude? 
1.  EU-Africa Relations: Partnership or Customary 
Platitude? 
The existence of historical ties between both Africa and the EU, no 
matter how unequal, oppressive, and exploitative it was, resulted in 
divergent views of contemporary relationship of both continents. From 
the European perspective, José Manuel Barrosso, President of European 
Commission, argues that the EU and Africa are equal partners.165 In a 
more uncertain tone, Hage Geingob, Namibia’s Minister for Trade and 
Industry, skeptically notes, “[a] partnership means that all partners are 
equal. Why else would you include the word partnership in the EPA?”166 
  
 161. Econ. Comm’n for Africa, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa V: 
Towards an African Continental Free Trade Area, June 2012, at 19–20 (showing 
direction of trade among regional integration arrangements). See also Dirar supra note 
127, at 136 (Particularly see table 2.2.2, which shows trade between and among major 
regional integration arrangements of Africa and the European Union, US and China. It 
shows how extra-regional trade is bigger than intra-regional trade.). 
 162. Econ. Comm’n for Africa, supra note 161, at 19. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 20. 
 165. See José Manuel Barrosso, EU and Africa Enjoying ‘Partnership of Equals’, 
PARLIAMENT, May 12, 2014 (“This was my third summit as president of the European 
commission and I can confirm that it was one of the most successful summits ever held 
between our two continents, illustrating the shared commitment to maintain and deepen 
relations as equal partners.”). 
 166. Jo-Maré Duddy, Namibia: Geingob Lays Into EU, NAMIBIAN, 
http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=53897&page=archive-read. (June 1, 2009) 
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Minister Geingob’s skepticism of partnership with the EU is a critique 
that highlights the existent power gap in the negotiations platform for 
EPAs.  
Controversies surrounding the idea of equal partnership were also 
manifest in the recent EU-Africa summit.167 The EU took the sole power 
of defining who should and should not be invited to participate from 
Africa.168 As a result, the idea of equal partnership between both 
continents became controversial. Jacob Zuma, President of the Republic 
of South Africa, eloquently summarized the African critique of the EU’s 
role in defining who can and cannot represent Africa.169 He said, 
  
(quoting Minister Geingob). See also Clair Gammage, (Re)conceptualizing International 
Economic Law: A Socio-legal Approach to Regionalism, in SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES 
TO INT’L ECONOMIC LAW 64, 71 (Amanda Perry-Kessaris ed., 2013) (discussing Minister 
Geingob’s comments on the issue of partnership with EU questions the motives of the 
Minister. Gammage noted that the Minister’s comments are not based on ideological anti-
neoliberalism rather a possible maneuver to get election votes. Minister Geingob’s 
critique and skepticism of the EU negotiation platform and style address broader 
concerns of power —which could be normative, military or economic—between the EU 
and Southern African states and its impact on the negotiation platform.).    
 167. The Fourth EU-Africa Summit was held at Brussels in April of 2014. See 
generally Fourth EU-Africa Summit Declaration (Apr. 2–3, 2014), 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2014/04/pdf/fourth-eu-africa-
summit-eu-africa-declaration-on-migration-and-mobility/. 
 168. In the fourth EU-Africa summit, the EU barred Eritrea and Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR). See, Abayomi Azikiwe, Several African States Boycott 
the EU Summit in Belgium, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/several-african-states-boycott-the-eu-summit-in-
belgium/5376073. The EU barred Eritrea for its human rights records. See id. In the case 
of the SADR, the justification was based on the result of its territorial dispute with 
Morocco. See id. It is interesting that the EU chose to invite Morocco, which is not a 
member of African Union, and bar SADR. See id. Similarly, the AU suspended Egypt as 
a result of the unconstitutional overthrow of elected government. See id. Nevertheless, 
without Egypt settling its affairs with the AU, the EU not only recognized the new 
military government in Egypt but also invited the latter to participate in the EU-Africa 
summit. See id. In short, without consideration of AU’s membership and AU’s concerns 
the EU decided the list of attendees. See id. 
 169. Gillian Pillay, SA Joins Other African Countries in Boycotting EU-Africa 
Summit, SABC (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/b7aefa80437527288db 
98da64eba5fdc/SA-joins-other-African-countries-in-boycotting-EU-Africa-Summit. 
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I think that time must pass wherein we are looked as subjects, we are 
told who must come, who must not come, we have not attempted to 
decide when we meet Europe; who must come and who must not come. 
It is wrong and causes this unnecessary unpleasantness. I thought the 
AU and EU are equal organisations representing two continents but 
there is not a single one of them who must decide for others.170 
In conclusion, African skepticism on the idea of equal partnership is a 
multi-faceted complexity of EU-Africa relations that has deep-rooted 
ideological and historical motivations. Historically, the memory and 
effect of a long history of colonial and racial-oppression perpetuated by 
European colonists is still felt. Ideologically, the debate is centered on 
the EU’s interest in promoting neoliberalism across the African 
continent. For African states in general, and Southern African states in 
particular, borrowing Kingsley Ighbor’s phrase, the focus on partnership 
is nothing but “customary platitude.”171 
2.  Negotiations for EPAs and Global Trade Liberalization 
The EU’s multilateral trade liberalization policies are the heart of 
EPA negotiations with Southern African states. EPAs, not only fit the 
WTO model of trade liberalization, but also narrow the policy space of 
African states, by promoting WTO plus liberalization agendas.172 In its 
foreign relations, the Treaty of Lisbon mandates the EU to aspire for free 
and fair trade.173 Unfortunately, however, pursuit of free trade policies 
  
 170. Id. 
 171. Kingsley Ighobor, Trade Between Two Unequal Partners: Africa and Europe 
Search for an Elusive Agreement, 28 AFR. RENEWAL, Aug., 2014, at 3 (discussing how 
sixty one heads of government and top level officials both from Africa and Europe in 
their discussion of EU-Africa relations came out with “customary platitudes,” one of 
which was “[w]e take particular pride in the breadth and depth of our partnership”) 
(emphasis added).  
 172. Hurt, supra note 128, at 495–504 (discussing how negotiations for trade 
liberalization between EU-Africa could lead to shrinking of policy space of African 
states).  
 173. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community art. 2(5), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, (“In 
its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
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has shadowed initiatives for fair-trading arrangements between Southern 
African and EU states.174  
Trade liberalization with the EU—is the biggest trading destination 
for Southern African products—has a significant impact on African 
states’ position on global trade liberalization efforts. Africa’s position, 
reluctance, and timely stalemate on global trade liberalization, would 
lack consistency both in terms of value and substance if African states 
liberalize trade with their major trading partner.175 In other words, it 
would be difficult for African states to argue against liberalized global 
economic order if and after they have liberalized the trade arrangement 
with their biggest trading destination. Of course, when one presumes that 
it could pave the way for African states signing into multilateral 
liberalization, in a way, one is assuming that African states are not 
capable of negotiating their stance at the multilateral level. Second, one 
is also assuming that African states will never be able to renegotiate 
EPAs once they sign into the agreement. On the contrary, no such 
assumption is made here, although the possibility of one or both of the 
assumptions coming into reality is possible.  
 
  
interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, 
security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among 
peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in 
particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development 
of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 174. See generally Alasdair R. Young & John Peterson, ‘We care about you, but 
…’: the politics of EU trade policy and development, 26 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 497 
(2013) (discussing the complex trade policy of the EU. Young and Peterson argue that 
the EU’s approach on trade as a tool for development shows a paradox between 
promoting development on the one hand and promoting global neoliberal market 
policies.). 
 175. See Michael Friis Jensen & Peter Gibbon, Africa and the WTO Doha Round: 
An Overview, 25 DEV. POL’Y REV. 5, 5 (2007) (discussing how preference erosion will 
lower Africa’s competitiveness in European market). 
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B.   Norms of Solidarity and Trade Relations with the EU 
Given the dependence of Southern African exporters in European 
markets and the unequal negotiation platform, loss of preferential access 
to European markets has a consequential impact for revenues of Southern 
African states.176 How do fears of loss of revenues and market access 
affect norms of solidarity among Southern African states? Historically, 
norms of solidarity are a reactionary construction of identity to European 
racial and colonial domination.177 Now that white colonial and racial 
domination has ended in the Southern African hemisphere, how 
influential are economic pressures in constituting or re-constituting 
solidarity arrangements of the region? Among Southern African states, 
are ideational concerns of norms of solidarity limited to decolonization 
and anti-apartheid aspirations?  
Norms of solidarity, among Southern African states are a culmination 
of the recognition of the relationship between ideational and material 
concerns. The history of SADC shows that in their anti-apartheid 
struggle, Southern African states emphasized ideational concerns at the 
multilateral level and limited material concerns to the state level. In other 
words, Southern African states galvanized global condemnation of 
  
 176. San Bilal & Vincent Roza, Addressing the Fiscal Effects of an EPA, 2007 
EUR. CTR. FOR DEV. POL’Y MGMT. 10 (2007), http://ecdpm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/Addressing-Fiscal-Effects-EPA-2007.pdf (showing that as a 
result of trade liberalization with Europe, it is estimated that Tanzania and Zambia would 
lose revenue amounting to 32.5% and 15.8%, respectively). See also Phillip Oladunjoye, 
Nigeria Rejects EPA over U.S. $1.3tr Revenue Loss –Man, DAILY INDEP. (LAGOS), Aug. 
15, 2014 (discussing how trade liberalization with the EU would cost Nigeria over a 
trillion U.S. dollars). 
 177. Mazrui, supra note 62. See also Samir Amin & Cherita Girvan, 
Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa – Their Historical Origins and 
Contemporary Forms, 22 SOC. & ECON. STUD. 177, 177 (1973) (discussing how 
interaction with other culture —for instance European colonialism—did not break 
African united identity. In his words, “[t]he image of an ancient, isolated and introverted 
Africa no longer belongs to this age: isolation—naturally associated with so-called 
‘primitive’ character—only corresponded to an ideological necessity born out of colonial 
racism. But these exchanges with other cultures did not break the unity of the African 
personality. On the contrary, they helped to assert and enrich it. The colonial conquest of 
almost the whole of the continent strengthened this feeling of unity of Black Africa.”). 
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apartheid practices, while at the same time forged agreements with 
Apartheid South Africa. 178 Most of these agreements concern economic 
relations. Zimbabwe, for instance, despite its concerns for equality of 
majority South Africans, forged trade relations with Apartheid South 
Africa.179 In short, Southern African states, although advocating 
ideational concerns for equality of all races in South Africa, constantly 
checked and re-checked material or self-interest maximizing policies as 
well.  
In the context of relations with the EU, Southern African states 
fragmented negotiation syndrome—where each states attempts to 
advance its concerns individually and as a member of a group—is a 
balancing act of norms of solidarity. However, what is not clearly 
defined in EPA negotiations is a common ideational concern of Southern 
African states. Review of current negotiations seems to focus on 
maintaining access to European markets rather than normativity. In 
  
 178. All Southern African states with the exception of Malawi severed formal 
relations with South Africa. Despite lack of formal relations, however, several Southern 
African states maintained unofficial relations with the apartheid regime. South Africa’s 
Foreign Relations During Apartheid 1948, SOUTH AFR. HIST. ONLINE, 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/20th-century-south-africa/south-africas-foreign-relations-
during-apartheid-1948 (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) [hereinafter South Africa’s Foreign 
Relations]; see also Zimbabwe, DEP’T OF INT’L RELATIONS & COOPERATION, 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/bilateral/zimbabwe.html, (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) 
(discussing the history of relations between South-Africa and Zimbabwe). [hereinafter 
Zimbabwe]. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, as members of SACU, had formal trade 
relations with Apartheid South Africa while at the same time condemning the latter’s 
discriminatory policies. See South Africa’s Foreign Relations supra; Zimbabwe supra. 
All Southern African states, with the exception of Malawi, severed formal relations with 
South Africa. See South Africa’s Foreign Relations supra; Zimbabwe supra. Despite lack 
of formal relations, however, several Southern African states maintained unofficial 
relations with the Apartheid regime. See South Africa’s Foreign Relations supra; 
Zimbabwe supra. Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, as members of SACU, had formal 
trade relations with apartheid South Africa while at the same time condemning the 
latter’s discriminatory policies. See South Africa’s Foreign Relations supra; Zimbabwe 
supra.  
 179. See generally Timothy Scarnecchia, Rationalizing “Gukurahundi”: Cold 
War and South African Foreign Relations with Zimbabwe, 1981-1983, 37 KRONOS 87, 87 
(2011) (discussing how in 1983 Zimbabwe’s ruling party (ZANU-PF) colluded with 
apartheid South Africa to limit support for ANC’s anti-apartheid operations from 
Zimbabwe). 
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conclusion, EPAs and trade liberalization are not capable of uprooting 
continental identity of African-ness. Nevertheless, as a result of a lack of 
common ideational concerns, in their negotiations with the EU, the value 
of norms of solidarity in framing foreign relations is in an actual state of 
degeneration.  
CONCLUSION 
Norms of solidarity define the way Southern African states behave 
towards each other. Norms of solidarity, by establishing identity of 
African-ness, harnessed support for decolonization and anti-apartheid 
movements. As a result of norms of solidarity, African states 
successfully triumphed over racial and colonial oppression. Norms of 
solidarity, now that white colonial and racial domination has ended in 
economic relations with the EU, emphasized material concerns. Indeed, 
Africa’s emancipation movement has changed and moved beyond the 
struggles against white racial and colonial oppression, and includes new 
forms of social emancipatory movements. However, the role and 
application of norms of solidarity in changing faces of African 
emancipatory movements has been overshadowed by concerns of 
maintaining access to European markets. Future re-constitution of norms 
of solidarity has the force to bring social emancipatory and global fair 
trade movements to light without challenging feelings of African-ness. 
To date, however, the ideational concerns of norms of solidarity has 
become of past triumphs. In conclusion, this Article is an attempt at 
theorizing norms of solidarity among Southern African states.  
 
 
